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with the “collocation of circumstances,” they may   violation of the Fourth Amendment.  Note, this is a
         permit a jury to infer that an individual participated  Sixth Circuit case and is not binding here in Texas
                          34                                 until/unless the holding is adopted by the U.S.
         in the crime.”     Wise’s argumentasks us to
                                                             Supreme Court or the Fifth Circuit Court of
         assume that the jury ignored one of its key roles—
                                                             Appeals. Further proceedings are likely on this case.
         makingrational inferences—which we cannot do.       Unless this holding is reversed, we can expect claims
         . . .                                               such as this in Texas.  xcerpts from the Sixth Circuit
         Though the evidence of  Wise’s guilt is more        opinion are below:
         circumstantial than evidence connecting Jordan to   Alison  Taylor, a frequent recipient of parking
         the crime, the record is not so devoid of evidence  tickets, sued the City and its parking enforcement
         that his guilty conviction is “shocking.” For       officer  Tabitha Hoskins, alleging that chalking
         instance, Wise was observed moving between the      violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free
         four robbery vehicles the morning of the crime and  from unreasonable search.  The City moved to
         communicating with various co-defendants. He        dismiss the action. The district court granted the
         ultimately switched vehicles with Anderson, who     City’s motion, finding that, while chalking may
         had been brought into the plan only that morning,   have constituted a search under the Fourth
         so that he would be in the same car as Santee, who  Amendment, the search was reasonable. Because
         didn’t have any details about the robbery.  The     we chalk this practice up to a regulatory exercise,
         evidence also demonstrates that Wise was on a       rather than a community-caretaking function, we
         conference call with the co-defendants throughout   REVERSE.
         the commission of the robbery, and he was           To determine whether a Fourth  Amendment
         ultimately arrested in a vehicle following the      violation has occurred, we ask two primary
         fleeing Tundra after the robbery was completed.     questions: first, whether the alleged government
         Witnesses testified that one bank employee was      conduct constitutes a search within the meaning of
         assaulted during the robbery; another employee      the Fourth Amendment; and second, whether the
         was threatened, albeit implicitly, when one of the  search was reasonable. We address each in turn.
         robbers brandished his firearm; and a gun was       …a search occurs when a government official
         pointed at a bank customer when he tried to enter   invades an area in which “a person has a
         the credit union. Guns were later retrieved from the  constitutionally protected reasonable expectation
         Tundra and from Jordan’s brother’s apartment in a   of privacy.”  Under Katz, a search is analyzed in
         shoebox with other robbery paraphernalia. Based     two parts: “first that a person exhibit an actual
         on this evidence, a reasonable jury, without being  (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
         manifestly unjust, could conclude that Wise was     that the expectation be one that society is prepared
         aware that his co-defendants would be carrying      to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”   A “physical
         weapons in the commission of the robbery, and that  intrusion” is not necessary for a search to occur
         those weapons would be used to threaten or assault  under Katz.   In accordance with  Jones, the
         those the robbers confronted.                       threshold question is whether chalking constitutes
                                                             common-law trespass upon a constitutionally
                                                             protected area. Though Jones [the GPS tracking
         CHALK-MARKING  TIRES FOR PARKING                    case.  Ed. ]  does not provide clear boundaries for
         ENFORCEMENT:   Unconstitutional????                 the meaning of common-law  trespass, . . .
         The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently (April  common-law trespass is “an act which brings
         22 nd , 2019) held in a case out of the Federal District  [about] intended physical contact with a chattel in
         Court in Michigan that marking tires with a chalk   the possession of another.”   Adopting this
         marker was an “unreasonable search” and therefore a  definition, there has been a trespass in this case



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