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characterization, the district court concluded that  essential principle recognized in Terry: the essence
        the bus interdiction constituted an unconstitutional  of an unconstitutional seizure is that a government
        checkpoint. First, the police forced the bus driver to  official has restrained a citizen’s liberty. See Terry
        interact with them.  The officers knew that          v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (“Only when
        Greyhound mandated that its bus drivers stop at      [an] officer, by means of physical force or show of
        specific locations for loading and unloading         authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of
        passengers. The Greyhound schedule was publicly      a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has
        available, and the police exploited it. Thus, “[w]hen  occurred.”).
        the bus driver saw the police waiting, he could not  Here, the Conroe Police Department did not
        avoid them.  Second, the checkpoint’s purpose was    establish an unconstitutional checkpoint.  The
        impermissible because the police sought “to          police did not require the bus driver to stop at the
        uncover evidence of ordinary crimes, like            station.  The driver made the scheduled stop as
        possession of narcotics.”                            required by his employer, Greyhound. The police
        The district court incorrectly characterized the bus  only approached the driver after he had
        interdiction as an unconstitutional checkpoint. The  disembarked from the bus. The police did not order
        Supreme Court’s Edmond opinion illustrates the       him to interact with them; after the police
        court’s error. The checkpoint in Edmond involved     approached him, the driver could have declined to
        “roadblocks.”  A central feature of the checkpoint   speak with the police.  The police in no way
        was that the police stopped the motorist for         restrained the driver. Thus, the interaction between
        questioning. Drivers could not ignore the officers   the officers and the driver lacked the essential
        or decline to answer questions.  Thus the law        features of a checkpoint. No case supports a
        enforcement officer forced the motorist to interact  contrary conclusion. Instead, as discussed below,
        with the authorities.                                the stop is better characterized as a bus interdiction.
        The Supreme Court’s other cases discussing           The Government argues that the district court
        checkpoints similarly involved government            clearly erred by finding that the bus driver did not
        officials initiating the stop. Lidster involved the  voluntarily consent to the Conroe Police
        police “block[ing] the eastbound lanes of the        Department’s search of Greyhound Bus #6408.
        highway,” “forc[ing] traffic to slow down,” and—     First, the Government argues that Wise does not
        when each vehicle passed through the                 have standing to challenge the voluntariness of the
        checkpoint—“stop[ping] [the vehicle] for 10 to 15    driver’s consent. Second, even if Wise has standing
        seconds.” Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 422     to challenge the driver’s consent, the Government
        (2004).  Sitz  involved a situation where: “[a]ll    argues that the driver voluntarily consented to the
        vehicles passing through a checkpoint would be       search. Wise disputes these points. We need only
        stopped [by the police] and their drivers briefly    address Wise’s standing to challenge the search.
        examined for signs of intoxication.” Sitz, 496 U.S.  Reviewing Fourth Amendment standing de novo,
        at 447. And Martinez–Fuerte involved a permanent     see Riazco, 91 F.3d at 754, we conclude that Wise,
        immigration checkpoint stationed by law              a commercial bus passenger, lacks standing to
        enforcement officers that brought traffic “to a      challenge the voluntariness of the driver’s consent
        virtual, if not a complete, halt.” United States v.  to permit the police to search the bus’s passenger
        Martinez–Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 546 (1976)            cabin.
        (footnote                               omitted).    Wise asserts that he has standing to challenge
         This line of checkpoint cases—and the apparent      whether the driver voluntarily consented to the
        concern with the government initiating the stop and  search of the Greyhound bus “because [he] had a
        forcing motorists to interact—stems from an          possessory interest in his luggage that was in the




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