Page 36 - TPA Journal March April 2025
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case en banc.                                        rule adds another component. As a judicially cre-
        Riley v. California, one of the recent Supreme       ated remedy rather than a constitutional require-
        Court cases applying the Fourth Amendment to         ment, the exclusionary rule is justified by the
        modern technology, held that the search of a cell-   deterrent effect of suppressing evidence when it
        phone incident to arrest requires a warrant.         was obtained unlawfully.  A key consideration in
        Morton and supporting amici view this case as a      deciding when suppression will deter is whether
        follow-on that allows us to flesh out when proba-    “law enforcement officers have acted in objective
        ble cause exists to believe that certain applications  good faith.”  The need to punish police conduct
        on a cellphone contain incriminating evidence.       and thus deter future violations via suppression
        They argue that Riley’s warrant requirement will     “assumes that the police have engaged in willful,
        be a mere formality if officers can search an entire  or at the very least negligent, conduct.”   The
        phone based on nothing more than the fact that       exclusionary rule is not aimed at “punish[ing] the
        criminals sometimes use phones to conduct their      errors of judges and magistrates” who issue war-
        illicit activity. Despite the invitation to treat this as  rants.
        another difficult case addressing how “the degree    Deference to the judge issuing the warrant and the
        of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth         exclusionary rule’s focus on deterring police mis-
        Amendment” is affected “by the advance of mod-       conduct results in the good-faith exception to the
        ern technology,” a longstanding rule resolves the    suppression remedy: A “‘warrant issued by a mag-
        case: Evidence should not be suppressed when         istrate normally suffices to establish’ that a law
        law enforcement obtained it in good-faith reliance   enforcement officer has ‘acted in good faith
        on a warrant.                                        in conducting a search.’”
        The good-faith rule flows from two central fea-      Normally, but not always.  The Supreme Court
        tures of modern Fourth  Amendment jurispru-          identified four situations when “a reasonably well
        dence: the warrant requirement and the suppres-      trained officer would have known that the search
        sion remedy. The Supreme Court has held that a       was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.”
        warrant is generally required for certain searches,  Reliance on a warrant is unreasonable when: 1)
        most notably searches of the home and most           the magistrate issued it based
        recently searches of cellphones incident to arrest.  on information the affiant knew was false or
        Behind the warrant requirement is the idea that the  should have known was false but for reckless dis-
        “inferences which reasonable men draw from evi-      regard of the truth; 2) the magistrate wholly aban-
        dence” to decide if probable cause exists should     doned the judicial role; 3) the warrant is based on
        “be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate       an affidavit so lacking in probable cause as to ren-
        instead of being judged by the officer engaged in    der belief in its existence unreasonable; and 4) the
        the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out    warrant is facially deficient in particularizing the
        crime.”  Although obtaining a warrant from that      place to be searched or things to be seized.
        neutral judge may burden law enforcement before      Morton principally tries to defeat good faith by
        it conducts the search, the police obtain a          invoking the third exception, which involves what
        benefit after the search. When a court reviews an    are commonly known as “bare bones” affidavits.
        after-the-fact challenge to the search, “the resolu-  “‘Bare bones’ affidavits contain wholly concluso-
        tion of doubtful or marginal cases . . . should be   ry statements, which lack the facts and circum-
        largely determined by the preference to be accord-   stances from which a magistrate can independent-
        ed to warrants.”  As a result, “[s]earches pursuant  ly determine probable cause.”
        to a warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry    A look at some bare-bones affidavits from
        into reasonableness.”                                Supreme Court cases shows just how bare they
        To this unwillingness to second guess the magis-     are. One affidavit, from the Prohibition Era, said
        trate who authorized the warrant, the exclusionary   nothing more than that the agent “has cause to sus-




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