Page 38 - TPA Journal March April 2025
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another close call whether there was probable        the focus on the entirety of the affidavit as Cherna
        cause to believe that evidence of drug possession    does is the traditional bare-bones inquiry, and con-
        would be found on the phones. But as we have         sistent with the ultimate question whether an offi-
        emphasized, on close calls second guessing the       cer would know the affidavit is “so lacking in
        issuing judge is not a basis for excluding evidence.  probable cause as to render belief in its existence
        Viewed in their entirety, the affidavits supporting  unreasonable” despite a judge’s finding that prob-
        the warrants are far from bare bones. It thus was    able cause existed.
        reasonable to rely on the warrants and search the    Viewing the entire affidavit against the broad
        phones.                                              phone search it authorized, it is borderline rather
        For most of this case, Morton’s argument was the     than bare bones. And even if our caselaw allowed
        one we have just addressed: that searching any       a photographs-only inquiry and Morton preserved
        part of his phones was unjustified because the affi-  that argument, we would still not characterize the
        davits establish probable cause only for drug pos-   evidence supporting that request as “wholly con-
        session and not the trafficking that is more logi-   clusory.”
        cally tied to phones. But even the panel originally  The officers relied in good faith on the warrants
        hearing this appeal did not accept that argument     the state judge issued.
        despite holding that the photos should have been     On finding images that appeared to be child
        suppressed. The panel recognized probable cause      pornography, they went back to the judge for addi-
        existed to “search Morton’s contacts, call logs,     tional warrants (Morton does not challenge how
        and text messages” on his phone, just not the pho-   the searches were conducted). We see no unrea-
        tos.  Morton now runs with this theory that good-    sonable law enforcement conduct that warrants
        faith should be “analyzed separately” for each       suppression of the evidence the searches discov-
        area to be searched. Because he did not make this    ered.
        claim in the district court or in his original appel-  We do not decide if the state judge should have
        late brief, it is forfeited, and we are not deciding it.  authorized full searches of the phones based on
        Even if we could consider Morton’s new argument      these affidavits. We decide only that the officers
        advocating a piecemeal analysis, it would not        acted in good faith when relying on the judge’s
        change our holding that the good-faith rule          decision to issue the warrants. This ruling hardly
        applies.  At least one other court has taken the     nullifies Riley as Morton, amici, and the dissent
        approach of the original panel in this case and ana-  suggest. Before Riley, police could have searched
        lyzed whether an affidavit is bare bones for partic-  Morton’s phones on the spot after arresting him.
        ular items to be searched.  Our precedent takes a    Because of Riley, the officers had to obtain war-
        different approach. When a defendant moved to        rants. For better or worse, the warrant requirement
        suppress evidence obtained under a warrant that      and good-faith rule make the judge presented with
        authorized the seizure of “twenty-six categories of  the warrant application the central guardian of
        evidence, primarily written and electronic docu-     Fourth  Amendment rights.   That has long been
        ments,” our good-faith inquiry did not parse prob-   true when officers seek to search a home;  Riley
        able cause for each category.  We instead focused    makes it true for searches of cellphones incident to
        on whether the affidavit as a whole was bare         arrest.
        bones, while “keep[ing] in mind that it is more dif-  The judgment is AFFIRMED
        ficult to demonstrate probable cause for an ‘all     U. S. v. Morton, 5 th  Cir., No. 19-10842, Aug. 22,
        records’ search of a residence than for other        2022.
        searches.”  That is, the scope of a warrant may
        influence whether it is bare bones. An affidavit
        that is not bare bones for a limited search could be
        bare when supporting a broader search. Keeping




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