Page 31 - TPA Journal May June 2021

of state or territorial law.” The doctrine of unreasonableseizure claims, the district court did
qualified immunity, however, adds a wrinkle to § not determine if Williams is entitled to qualified
1983 pleadings when qualified immunity is immunity on those claims. Rather, it granted
relevant. However, because qualified immunity 12(b)(6) dismissal because it concluded that
is “not simply immunity from monetary liability” Arnold did not plausibly allege a search or
but also “immunity from having to stand trial,” seizure.
there is an interest in qualified immunity entering
a lawsuit “at the earliest possible stage of We first consider whether Arnold plausibly
litigation.” stated either an unreasonable search or an
unreasonable seizure by turning to the two
This immunity-from-suit interest does not require elements of a § 1983 claim set forth in Gomez: (i)
that the plaintiff’s original complaint exceed the deprivation of a federal right; and (ii) action
short-and-plain-statement standard of Rule 8. under color of state law. The district court
Anderson, 845 F.3d at 589–90. Rather, “a correctly recognized that Arnold sufficiently
plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity pleaded the second element, action under color
must plead specific facts that both allow the court of state law, for both the unreasonablesearch
to draw the reasonable inference that the claim and the unreasonable-seizure claim. In
defendant is liable for the harm he has alleged reviewing Arnold’s complaint, we determine that
and that defeat a qualified immunity defense with Arnold also plausibly alleged the first element as
equal specificity.” That is, a plaintiff must plead to the unreasonable-search claim but not as to
qualified-immunity facts with the minimal the unreasonable-seizure claim.
specificity that would satisfy Twombly and Iqbal.
Furthermore, if the defendant first raises Arnold’s complaint consists of a narrative
qualified immunity, the district court, “‘may recitation of facts followed by a series of legal
[then] in its discretion, insist that a plaintiff file a claims. Although the complaint is difficult to
reply tailored to [the defendant’s] answer [or follow, the factual allegations in combination
motion to dismiss] pleading the defense of with the short legal claims plausibly state a
qualified immunity.’” search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Arnold alleges that Williams
In this case, Arnold broadly addressed qualified entered the curtilage of Arnold’s home,
immunity in his original complaint by alleging questioned him, and then asked him for
that Deputy Williams “knowingly violated” identification. Arnold then summarizes these
“clearly established law.” Williams explicitly facts with the legal claim that “[a]ctions taken
raised qualified immunity in his memorandum in related to the stop, seizure and search were
support of his motion to dismiss, but the district objectively unreasonable and violated clearly
court did not require Arnold to file a Shultea established law.”
reply tailored to the defense of qualified
immunity. In his memorandum in opposition to We hold that Arnold’s complaint plausibly
the motion to dismiss, Arnold addressed qualified alleges a trespassory search of his home. The
immunity, albeit in a merely conclusory fashion: complaint alleges that Arnold found Williams
“The Court should find that qualified immunity lingering in an odd part of the curtilage—
does not apply to this case.” In dismissing under the carport—at an odd hour—2:00 a.m—
Arnold’s unreasonable-search and and that Williams immediately asked for

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