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identification from Arnold when he emerged. plaintiff will fail to find evidentiary support for
There is nothing in the complaint to suggest that his allegations or prove his claim to the
Williams knocked; to the contrary Arnold alleges satisfaction of the factfinder.”). Instead, the
that “he was awoken by the sound of someone district court must simply decide if the complaint
outside his door.” Arnold alleges actions that plausibly alleges a claim for relief. By stating a
would fall outside the “implicit license” afforded Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 and
private visitors. These details make plausible the stating facts that make plausible an unreasonable
allegation that Williams’s search of the curtilage search, Arnold meets the minimal pleading
of Arnold’s home was unreasonable insofar as it standard necessary to survive a 12(b)(6) motion
infringed on privacy and exigent circumstances to dismiss on that claim, at least as to the two §
were lacking. 1983 elements set forth in Gomez. He has not
done so for his unreasonable-seizure claim.
Conversely, Arnold’s further assertions that Ordinarily, after determining that a plaintiff had
Williams “wanted his name” and “wanted to see plausibly alleged constitutional violations, we
a driver’s license” and then “told” Arnold to would turn to the qualified-immunity analysis.
come to his police car do not plausibly allege a Here, however, “the district court found the
seizure. Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit caselaw complaint deficient on its face and never
makes clear that a Fourth Amendment seizure reached” qualified immunity. “Because as a
occurs in one of two ways: either an officer general rule, we do not consider an issue not
applies physical force or an officer makes a show passed upon below, we remand for the district
of authority to which an individual submits. court to decide in the first instance whether
Arnold alleges at most an attempt to apply [qualified immunity] defeats” Arnold’s
physical force when he says that Deputy unreasonable-search claim. We therefore reverse
Williams “reached to grab” Arnold. He simply the dismissal of the unreasonable search claim
does not allege actual physical force. Arnold does and remand for the district court to consider
allege a show of authority on behalf of Deputy qualified immunity before proceeding to the
Williams, particularly when he alleges that merits of the case. We however affirm the
Deputy Williams “told” him to go to the car. dismissal of the unreasonable-seizure claim.
Arnold does not, however, allege that he
submitted to that authority. Cf. Carroll, 800 F.3d Arnold failed to state a false arrest/false
at 170. He alleges instead that when Deputy imprisonment claim, because he failed to
Williams told him to go to the car, he declined. plausibly allege that his ultimate arrest was false.
Further, he alleges that when Deputy Williams The district court was wrong to seemingly adopt
reached to grab him, he fled. The complaint lacks the “‘heightened’ pleading requirement” urged
allegations that would allow us, drawing all by Williams. As explained above, § 1983 claims
reasonable inferences in Arnold’s favor, to implicating qualified immunity are not subject to
conclude that Arnold plausibly alleged a seizure a heightened pleading standard. Nevertheless,
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. after reviewing the record, we agree with the
At the 12(b)(6) stage of litigation, it is district court that “the sparse and conclusory
inappropriate for a district court to weigh the factual allegations are insufficient to state a claim
strength of the allegations. (“[W]hen a complaint for false arrest/false imprisonment.” Because
adequately states a claim, it may not be dismissed Arnold’s conclusory allegations do not plausibly
based on a district court’s assessment that the allege false imprisonment or false arrest,
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