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headlights kind of look”. He thought he “pos- there must be a sign “within a reasonable dis-
sibly had a human trafficking case.”1 Collins tance of the traffic stop.” However, because
turned on his lights to pull over the Explorer. “there are no specific guidelines for the spac-
When the passenger rolled down the window, ing of the ‘left lane for passing only’ signs,”
Collins saw three people huddled between courts must determine “whether such a sign is
the back seat and the front seat on the floor- applicable on the facts of each case.” Castillo
board. He identified the driver as contends that Collins could not have had rea-
Defendant–Appellant Castillo and the passen- sonable suspicion to stop his vehicle because
ger as Giselle Lysette Gonzalez. there were several on- and off-ramps between
the sign and the site of the stop. We are not
A federal grand jury indicted Castillo on one persuaded by Garcia’s suggestion that an offi-
count of conspiring to transport aliens within cer must have specific knowledge that the
the United States and three counts of trans- suspect passed the sign.
porting certain aliens within the United
States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324. To conclude that an officer does not have rea-
Castillo moved to suppress the evidence from sonable suspicion unless he knows the defen-
the traffic stop, including the discovery of the dant passed the sign is essentially to require
undocumented passengers, as obtained in certainty that a violation occurred. This would
violation of the Fourth Amendment. raise the standard for reasonable suspicion far
above probable cause or even a preponder-
The Government bears the burden of proving ance of the evidence, in contravention of the
that Collins’s stop was supported by “a rea- Supreme Court’s instructions. “[T]he level of
sonable, articulable suspicion that criminal suspicion the standard requires is consider-
activity is afoot.” (“[I]n justifying the particu- ably less than proof of wrongdoing by a pre-
lar intrusion the police officer must be able to ponderance of the evidence, and obviously
point to specific and articulable facts which, less than is necessary for probable cause.”
taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant that intru- Castillo argues that, except for Collins’s testi-
sion.”). “Although a mere hunch does not cre- mony and the dashboard-camera video, the
ate reasonable suspicion, the level of suspi- Government introduced no evidence about
cion the standard requires is considerably less “(1) the traffic patterns on U.S. Highway 59 in
than proof of wrongdoing by a preponder- general, on the stretch of highway at issue
ance of the evidence, and obviously less than here, or on the several country roads that
is necessary for probable cause.” “In deter- access the stretch of highway between the
mining whether the officer’s suspicion, as posted sign and where the trooper observed
based on specific and articulable facts, was the vehicle” or “(2) how many vehicles used
reasonable, the totality of the circumstances the several turnarounds and at least one true
must be considered.” exit ramp on that stretch of highway.” As
Castillo points out, the Government “did not
A traffic violation provides officers with elicit testimony or present other evidence
authority for an investigative stop. For a dri- about the population of the area, or how
ver in the left lane to violate the sign-compli- many ranches, homes, or businesses, for
ance provision, he must have notice, i.e., example, are located in the area.” Finally,
NOV/DEC 2015 www.texaspoliceassociation.com • 866-997-8282 19
