Page 30 - TPA Journal November December 2022
P. 30

the same circumstances would not continue to         While Appellant’s conduct alone may not have
        resist arrest and would not “pull and jerk” or try to  been sufficient to cause Reeves’s and Carper’s
        go between officers while they are attempting to     injuries, neither can the officers’ actions alone be
        restrain him.                                        considered sufficient to cause the resulting harm.
                                                             Carper’s and Reeves’s actions cannot be
        The jury heard, on video, Appellant claim that he    characterized as “alone” because they were acting
        was trying to give Carper the bag in his hand. They  in response to Appellant’s conduct. We cannot
        also heard him say that he did not grab Carper.      isolate the officers’ actions and view them as a
        However, there is evidence to the contrary, and it is  wholly independent cause of their injuries—they
        within the purview of the jury to resolve            would not have responded in the manner they did
        inconsistencies in the evidence.  Carper and Reeves  had it not been for Appellant’s conduct in reacting
        testified to Appellant’s actions, and the jury was   to Carper’s search. Because Appellant’s conduct
        free to believe them. The video evidence does not    and the officers’ conduct together caused the harm,
        contradict their testimony.   Under these            the but-for causation requirement is satisfied.
        circumstances, a rational jury could find            Appellant’s actions, when considered in
        Appellant’s actions to be reckless.                  conjunction with Carper’s and Reeves’s actions,
                                                             were sufficient to have caused the officers’ injuries.
        Appellant also argues that the evidence is           Nonetheless, a determination that Appellant’s
        insufficient to show he caused Carper’s and          actions were a but-for cause of the officers’ injuries
        Reeves’s injuries. As mentioned above, the relevant  does not settle the matter. Criminal offenses require
        test for criminal responsibility, or causation, is   voluntary acts.
        contained in Texas Penal Code § 6.04(a): “A person
        is criminally responsible if the result would not    Concern has been expressed that “any minor
        have occurred but for his conduct, operating either  scuffle during an arrest will result in a defendant
        alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the  being charged solely with assault on a public
        concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce   servant.”   However, this is not the case.
        the result and the conduct of the actor clearly
        insufficient.” There must be “a ‘but for’ causal     Mere resistance to an officer’s contact, detention,
        connection . . . between the defendant’s conduct     search, or arrest cannot be considered assault of a
        and the resulting harm.”  If there are concurrent    public servant without more. Injuries to officers
        causes, the but-for requirement can be satisfied if  that occur while they are performing their law
        1) the defendant’s conduct alone was clearly         enforcement duties can be the result of non-
        sufficient to cause the harm; or 2) the defendant’s  voluntary and accidental forces. This can be true
        conduct and the other cause together were            even if the resulting injuries would not have
        sufficient to cause the harm. However, if the other  occurred but for a suspect’s actions. For assault on
        cause alone was clearly sufficient to cause the      a public servant to occur, the defendant must have
        resulting harm, and the defendant’s conduct by       been a but-for cause of an officer’s injuries, and his
        itself was clearly insufficient to cause the resulting  actions that are considered the but-for cause of the
        harm, the defendant is not criminally responsible.    injury must have been performed voluntarily.
                                                             Physical movements that are the nonvolitional
        Appellant argues that Carper’s and Reeves’s actions  result of someone else’s act or that are set in
        were the cause of their injuries. He posits that his  motion by an independent non-human force,
        conduct could not have caused their injuries—        physical reflex, convulsion, unconscious act, act
        meaning he cannot be considered criminally           under hypnosis, and other “nonvolitional impetus”
        responsible. We disagree.                            are not voluntary acts.






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