Page 34 - TPA Journal November December 2022
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factual findings for clear error and the district    jackets are not exactly like suitcases, and neither
        court’s conclusions. . . de novo.”  Rodriguez does   party, nor this court, has located any precedent
        not challenge any of the district court’s fact       squarely addressing Rodriguez’s theory.
        findings. Thus, as the government concedes, the      Second, Rodriguez maintains that he has standing
        only questions before us are legal ones that we      to challenge the search because it qualifies as a
        review de novo.                                      trespass. Because he did not advance that theory
                                                             before the district court, it is subject to the
        A Fourth Amendment inquiry typically proceeds in     demanding standard of plain-error review.
        two parts: A court first asks whether the defendant
        had standing to challenge the search and then, if the  Rodriguez relies primarily on United States v.
        answer is yes, asks whether the search was           Richmond,  which itself interprets United States v.
        reasonable. In other contexts, that order would be   Jones,.  Those cases hold that, in addition to the
        not just typical but mandatory. Standing is a matter  more familiar reasonable expectation-of-privacy
        of jurisdiction, and courts must assess their        test described above, a defendant can show Fourth
        jurisdiction before turning to the merits.           Amendment standing if the government has
                                                             committed a common-law trespass as part of an
        But Fourth Amendment standing is a different         investigation.  But the recent vintage of those cases
        matter. “The concept of standing in Fourth           leaves us with few authorities interpreting them,
        Amendment cases can be a useful shorthand . . .      and we do not have the benefit of the district
        but it should not be confused with Article III       court’s assessment.
        standing . . . .”  To the contrary, Fourth Amendment
        standing “is not a jurisdictional question and hence  All of that is to say that the question of
        need not be addressed before addressing other        Rodriguez’s standing is difficult. Admittedly,
        aspects of the merits of a Fourth Amendment          “judges may not invoke judicial modesty to avoid
        claim.”   Thus, we are not bound to decide whether   difficult questions.”  But neither is it “the role of
        Rodriguez had standing to challenge the search of    the federal courts to answer legal questions unless
        his jacket. Instead, the usual rule applies, and we  specific cases need answers.”   In keeping with that
        may affirm the judgment for any reason supported     principle, we reserve for another day the theories
        by the record.  Thus, we may affirm if we            of Fourth Amendment standing presented by
        conclude, as we do, that that search was lawful.     Rodriguez; we turn instead to a question to which
                                                             our precedents provide a more certain answer.
        That course is particularly appropriate here in light
        of the novelty of the Fourth Amendment standing      Turning to the merits of the search of Rodriguez’s
        questions. Rodriguez presents two theories in        jacket, we conclude that the search was reasonable.
        support of Fourth Amendment standing, and            Specifically, it was justified by the protective
        precedent does not definitively answer either. First,  sweep exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
        Rodriguez maintains that he had a reasonable         warrant requirement.  The protective-sweep
        expectation of privacy in the jacket. “Typically,” a  exception was first articulated in the vehicular
        passenger in a car, as distinct from the driver,     context in Michigan v. Long.  The Court allowed
        “lacks standing to complain of its search.”  But this  police “to conduct an area search of the passenger
        circuit has recognized an exception for a            compartment [of a vehicle] to uncover weapons, as
        passenger’s personal luggage. “The owner of a        long as they possess an articulable and objectively
        suitcase located in another’s car may have a         reasonable belief that the suspect is potentially
        legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to    dangerous.”  Such searches are permissible even if
        the contents of his suitcase.”   Rodriguez maintains  a suspect has been removed from the vehicle—as
        that the same logic extends to the pockets of the    long as he “is not placed under arrest, he will be
        jacket he had removed and left in the vehicle. But   permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will


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