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facilitate evidence gathering. In addition, obtaining direct evidence of a cartel
agreement may require special investigative powers, tools and techniques

which may not be at the disposal of less experienced or new authorities.

This may mean that the competition agency in such jurisdictions would
have greater difficulty in generating direct evidence in cartel cases, and have

to rely more heavily on circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is

nevertheless accepted in most developed countries, reflecting the importance
of this type of evidence for the successful enforcement of competition law.

This article aims to answer the key question whether circumstantial

evidences should be accepted in hardcore cartel cases. The author will
address and examine experiences from Japan, Indonesia and South Korea

where circumstantial evidences are utilized by competition authority and

the court.

Keywords : competition law, circumstantial evidences, economic

evidences, hardcore cartel

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