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            choice-of-law issues have been discussed, with attempts at resolution over a long period
            in an international context.  However, the Japanese Supreme Court adopted a very
                                       18
            particular formulation without any reference to or consideration taken of this long
            international discussion.

                    It is very probable that the Japanese Supreme Court adopted the concept of
            “state ready for use” from Japan’s domestic Road Transportation Vehicle Act. This act

            originally had only the character of administrative regulation on the basis of the car
            registration system, but to the original and former act, the new act added some provisions

            regarding the acquisition and transfer of property of a car to be registered.  This act
                                                                                     19
            stipulates that a car should be registered for putting it in a “state ready for use”. Such
            a concept as a state ready for use that had originally been incorporated in the domestic

            administrative regulation was now adopted and applied as a key concept regarding
            the choice-of-law rule on international private law matters.

                       The Supreme Court limited its argument to cars as one kind of movable.
                                                                                             20
            This limitation enabled the court to apply the concept derived from the Road Transport
            Vehicle Act. What of other kinds of movable? Why did the court adopt such a formulation

            that can only be applied to car property? This shows a serious defect in the theoretical
            perspective of the current Japanese Supreme Court.


                    Background concern in terms of the formulation
                    Why has the Japanese Supreme Court set such a formulation? We can guess

            the reason against the background of theoretical and practical antagonism regarding



            (1990) pp.155-56; SOVILLA, Eigentumsübergang an beweglichen Körperlichen Gegenständen bei internationalen
            Käufen (1954) pp.72-73.
                    18  For instance, see KREUZER, La propriété mobilière en droit international privé, RdC 1996, p.9-318.
                    19  The former Road Transport Vehicle Act was originally enacted as Law No. 191, 1943. Then the new
            Act, including a provision regarding the acquisition of property rights on registered cars (art.5) was enacted as Law
            No.185, 1951.
                    20  As for the Supreme Court’s deliberate limitation of argument in its judgment, see HARATA (supra
            note*) 386-87. Although the Supreme Court discussed the interpretation of art.10 of Horei comprehensively
            regarding the choice-of-law on ownership and other property rights, it limited its focus on the issue of transfer of
            ownership for movables by way of transaction. In addition, it discusses only the ownership of cars as a particular
            kind of movable thing.



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