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grenfell: what have we learned?

flow-stopping bag, at which point the
flames in the tower went out.
A permanent cut and cap operation
using the correct equipment for a 15in
main was completed by 06.15hrs the
following morning.
I was engaged to act as the gas expert
witness in February 2018 and I visited
the tower for the first time at the end
of that month. I revisited the tower
with an official Metropolitan Police
photographer in May 2018. Over time,
I examined just over 4,000 documents,
photographs and drawings while
drafting my report to the inquiry. I
had to bear in mind that the bereaved,
survivors and relatives (BSRs) were one
of the audiences for the report.
The gas evidence to phase 2 of the
inquiry was presented over three days
in July 2021. I presented my evidence
on 14 July. Regulations 1972 were in force at the installations where the emergency
From my site visits, scrutiny of time of installation. In any event, pipes control valve was either fully or partially
documents and consideration of the were embedded in concrete floors/ in the ‘on’ position thereby presenting
input from other expert witnesses, I ceilings and so were stressed from the an ‘open end’ through which gas could
believe the following topics will be extreme heat of the fire and building have fed the fire. Of those 26, the meter
of particular interest to utilisation movement during the fire. In one of the regulator in 18 instances had either been
personnel and building owners. flats one of the risers was ruptured. melted or otherwise badly damaged.
Another one of the risers had been cut The meter or meter regulator in the
LINK BETWEEN FIRE SAFETY ORDER AND DSEAR off for leakage on 30 September 2016. remaining eight instances had been
Article 12 and Part 4 of Schedule 1 of The leak was on the section of pipe removed at the time of the inspection.
the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) embedded in the floor between two flats. The meter regulator is made in an
Order 2005, otherwise known as The I understand that one of the reasons aluminium alloy and its specification,
Fire Safety Order, addresses dangerous why sleeves through walls and floors IGEM/GM/PRS/3, does not include any
substances. The content is virtually were introduced by the Gas Safety reference to fire resistance.
the same as that in Regulation 6 of Regulations 1972 was that there had
DSEAR. Both pieces of legislation been a number of cases of leaks on EXCESS FLOW VALVES AND THERMAL
refer to containment of the dangerous pipework embedded in concrete in CUT OFF DEVICES
substance and to ventilation. the late 1960s early 1970s due to the Since its first edition, IGEM/G/5 has
Awareness of this link provides chemical reaction between the concrete called for the installation of excess flow
common ground for communication and bare steel pipe. valves and/or thermal cut off devices
between the gas engineer and the where indicated as being required
building owner. UNVENTILATED VOIDS following risk assessment. There are
Other articles of interest within the Another requirement brought in by German standards for both fittings and
Fire Safety Order include Article 22, the Gas Safety Regulations 1972 was a I have recommended to the inquiry that
which places a duty to co-operate onto prohibition on the installation of pipes such devices be the subject of a British
relevant parties. in unventilated voids. The routes of or Gas Industry (GIS) Standard.
the risers after they left the basement
ACCESS TO VALVES IN AN EMERGENCY were through unventilated utility KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING
At Grenfell Tower, there were branch compartments. Evidence to the inquiry has highlighted
and inlet isolation valves at high level the need for anyone designing or
in the basement which could not be DAMAGED COOKERS AND BURNT-OUT COOKER HOSES installing gas infrastructure into multi-
accessed without scaffolding. Corgi Technical Services, working for occupancy buildings to have knowledge
the Metropolitan Police, identified at and understanding of key elements of
SIGNAGE least 14 damaged cookers, each with a Approved Document B to the Building
Grenfell Tower had no signage or plan missing or burnt-out cooker hose. Regulations. Topics include ventilation,
in the vicinity of the valves to indicate Edition 3 of IGEM/G/5 will specify fire compartmentation, fire stopping,
their function and what the individual that a new or replacement gas cooker firefighting stairs and the difference
risers were serving. hose for a cooker installed in a multi- between reaction to fire tests and tests
occupancy building shall be to BS EN for fire resistance.
PIPES NOT SLEEVED THROUGH WALLS AND FLOORS 14800. Gas cooker hoses to BS EN 14800
The original gas supply system was are fire resistant in accordance with Rodney Hancox’s full report, plus
installed when the tower was built procedure B in Annex A of BS EN 1775. additional documents and a transcript
between 1972 and 1974. It is not known of the hearing, can be downloaded
precisely when installation took place DAMAGED METER INSTALLATIONS from the inquiry’s website at www.
and therefore whether the Gas Safety There were at least 26 damaged meter grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk

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