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On the other hand, we can differentiate between the cases. In the mining the percentage of damage without a doctor’s opinion. If this
case presented to the Maharam, the husband was acting deceitfully,
so he had good reason to think that his wife would do the same. In
the case of the apostate, he naively and foolishly thought it would be
wrong, as a Christian, to give her a bill of divorce. Thus he had no
reason to think his wife would deceive him. According to this rea-
soning we might say that he gave the divorce erroneously and it is not
halachically valid.
I asked my revered father-in-law, Rav Y. S. Elyashiv zt”l this ques-
tion. He said the Maharam Alsheich’s view is a novel one. Since there
is a real possibility that the bill of divorce is erroneous, how can one
allow this married woman to remarry? Perhaps in those days it was
more common to make a moda’ah in front of a beis din, stating that a
person is being coerced and does not really mean what he or she says,
and the husband should have thus made a condition that the kesubah
be torn up, to insure himself against deception. Since the husband did
not do that, one can conclude that he did not care about forgoing the
kesubah. The Responsa Eitz Yitzchak (Even Haezer #36) disagrees with
Maharam Alsheich and treats the possibility of an erroneous bill of
divorce very stringently. Therefore, in our case, my father-in-law zt”l
strongly opposed this possibility of falsifying medical information.
1 Conclusion
A falsified statement by a physician is of no benefit, because it will be
an erroneous get.
288 1 Medical-HalacHic Responsa of Rav ZilbeRstein
is the case, then the physician is obligated to reveal his rights to him.
On the other hand, it is possible that he himself could have consulted
with another physician to assess the damages he sustained. Since he
did not do so, perhaps he waived his rights and therefore we would
have to remain silent.
I asked my father-in-law, Rav Y. S. Elyashiv zt”l, this question. His
opinion was that the insurance company is obligated to the damaged
person as well as the damager. In exchange for payments it receives
from the damager, the insurance company obligates itself to both of
them. Since the disabled man is halachically considered the litigant,
the insurance company becomes obligated to pay what is due him
for his disability. If his disability is halachically worth more, then the
insurance company is guilty of theft. Therefore, my father-in-law
ruled that the physician is obligated to reveal the information, just
like someone who knows testimony for the benefit of his fellow is
obligated to testify, as explained in the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen
Mishpat #28:1).
If the physician will definitely lose his livelihood as a result, he may
be exempt from revealing the extent of the disability. As it states in
Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat #264:1): “His lost object takes pre-
cedence over that of his friend and even of his father.” The Shulchan
Aruch concludes, however, that “Even so, a person has to act above
and beyond the law and not be a a stickler for detail and say ‘mine is
first’ if it does not involve an obvious loss.” And the same applies in
our case.
1 SuMMaRy and Conclusions
1. The physician is obligated to tell the injured party that he is
entitled to more than he is asking.
2. If the physician may lose his job as a result, he is exempt from
disclosing this.
3. Even if he would certainly lose his job the physician should try,
if he can, to get the information to the injured party clandes-
tinely.
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