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tion in order to finish up with the birth and to arrive on time at his
place of work in the hospital.
This physician violated the woman’s trust in him. He also violated
the prohibitions of injuring and deceiving and stealing money when
he put his personal considerations before those of the woman in
childbirth who had paid him good money. This is not how Hashem’s
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agents - those who are entrusted with the sacred mitzvos of “And your
brother shall live with you,” and “You shall return [his health] to him,”
and “Heal, he shall heal” - behave.
This case is also worse than the unnecessary amputation of part
of a limb. In the latter case, one can at least notify the government
and the insurance company that the amputation was done at the
patient’s request, without medical justification. In this way, at least he
can undo the sin of stealing. In the case of an unnecessary c-section,
however, the doctor restricts the number of subsequent births this
woman will have. It is very difficult to fix such a sin, a sin against both
G-d and man.
Additional and unnecessary amputation is prohibited for two
reasons:
1) The prohibition of stealing. If the government or the insurance
companies knew that more than necessary was cut in order to
receive a greater stipend, they would never give him the money.
Thus the patient is guilty of stealing, and the physician who did
the procedure assisted him in this.
2) The prohibition of wounding. A person is forbidden to wound
himself, as explained in maseches Bava Kamma (90b). Likewise
the Rambam (Hilchos Shevuos 5:17 and Hilchos Chovel Umazik
5:1) rules that a person is not the owner of his body, but his
body belongs to the Holy One, blessed be He, as it is written
(Yechezkel 18:4): “The souls here belong to Me.” The Radvaz
(Hilchos Sanhedrin 8:6) writes that this is why we do not kill
a person nor flog him based on his own testimony, if there are
no witnesses. We do not say that the “admission of a litigant is
equivalent to 100 witnesses” as we do in regard to a monetary
290 1 Medical-HalacHic Responsa of Rav ZilbeRstein
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sticks, Rava would not have obligated him to pay more. If halachah,
according to Rav Yossi, dictates that he pay the cost of a stone fence,
why didn’t Rava automatically force him to do so? Why did he first
suggest compromise?
The Nesivos answers: In a case where someone is holding on to
money that does not belong to him, and the claimant mistakenly asks
only for a portion of what is coming to him, the beis din is obligated
to inform the claimant of this so that he can get back all that is right-
ly coming to him. In Runya’s case, he did not have any of Ravina’s
money and did not take anything from Ravina. It was simply that
according to the halachah our Sages decreed that one neighbor can 10
build a fence and force his neighbor to buy half of it. As long as the
second neighbor hasn’t paid for his share, the fence belongs to the one
who erected it, and the second neighbor is not guilty of theft. In a case
like this, the beis din is not instructed to enlighten the claimant as to
his rights so that he force his neighbor to pay for the fence. Therefore,
Rava did not obligate Runya immediately to pay for part of the stone
wall, but told him to compromise with Ravina. Otherwise Ravina
could rightfully demand that Runya buy half his fence, and the beis
din would back him up.
The Nesivos continues to say that according to his explanation, the
words of the Rama are exact. As he writes: “A litigant who sues his
fellow for a small thing, and the judge sees that he will owe him much
more than he claims…” The Rama did not write that the defendant is
currently obligated to pay more, but that he will owe him in the future.
In other words, only if the prosecutor decides to sue in beis din would
he be obligated to pay more. In this case, the judge should not inform
the claimant that he can demand more.
In light of the above, there is room to claim that the physician
should not tell the patient that he is entitled to more than he is asking
for. This is because according to halachah we do not have to power to
obligate the car owner to pay compensation, for a number of reasons:
1. It is not certain that he directly damaged him. It could certainly
have happened indirectly or by accident or because the injured par-
ty was not careful enough. 2. Nowadays we do not have certified
Informing someone that he is entitled to compensation 2 307
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