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The Pischei Choshen adds, as follows: 3 last moment, before they started the search for illegal liquor, Reuven
We can prove that Reuven is obligated to pay, on the
basis of what is explained in the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen
Mishpat #380:4): If a person lightened the load on a boat
about to be overwhelmed by a huge wave by throwing
cargo overboard, he is exempt from paying for the cargo,
because the cargo is viewed as a “pursuer,” who is endan-
gering all on board. Only if the boat was on the verge of
sinking when he threw the cargo into the sea, is he exempt.
But if he threw the cargo overboard before the huge wave
threatened to sink the boat, he is obligated to pay for the
cargo even if later it became clear that his actions saved
the ship.
And in my humble opinion, Reuven is obligated to pay. It is a
basic principle in the Torah that a meritorious deed which results
in a negative outcome is still considered a meritorious act. Likewise
a negative act that results in a positive outcome is still considered a
negative act, as explained in the Ran (Gittin 19b, from the pages of the
Rif, s.v. umistabra).
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim #222:4) states as follows: One
recites the blessing of Hatov Vehameitiv for something good, even
if he is concerned that bad may come of it. For example, if he finds
a lost object and he is worried that someone will take it from him,
he still says the blessing. Likewise one recites baruch dayan ha’emes
when a bad event occurs, even if some good can come to him from
it, such as if it rained on his field and when the deluge passes it may
do him good. The Mishnah Berurah (ibid., 5) explains this halachah
as follows: We should not look at the future because what we expect
may not happen. Thus in our case as well, we could say that one who
damages his friend is obligated to pay for the damages because he did
a bad thing to him, in spite of the fact that later it turned out to be
for his benefit.
However, if at the time that Reuven broke the barrels, Shimon’s
store was already surrounded by police and tax collectors, and at the
74 1 Medical-HalacHic Responsa of Rav ZilbeRstein
# 20818
broke the barrels, Reuven is exempt because rather than a damaging
act, his was an act of rescue. Although Reuven did not know this
when he broke the barrels, it is in accordance with the Mekor Chayim
and Orchos Hamishpatim, and resembles the case of the man who
spreads a net on Shabbos to catch fish and tows in a child.
Therefore in our case the physician is exempt from returning the
payment he received from the woman for the Caesarean section, since
this surgery saved her life. Even though the physician’s intentions
were wrong, in actuality the surgery was an act of rescue.
The question remains, however, whether or not the physician is
held accountable for his act by a Heavenly Court.
Regarding the verse (Bereishis 50:20): “And Yoseph said to them,
do not be afraid; you meant evil against me but G-d meant it for
good,” the Or Hachayim comments that if someone intended to give
his friend a cup of poison to drink and by accident gave him a cup of
wine, he is completely exempt in Heaven. The physician in our case
meant to give the woman a cup of poison by performing unnecessary
surgery on her, but in action, he gave her a cup of wine by removing a
malignant tumor she had. Thus the physician is exempt by the Heav-
enly Court as he is by a human one.
The Keli Chemdah poses a question: What is the difference be-
tween the above case and someone who intended to eat pork but ate
lamb, who requires kapparah? (Nazir 23a). And he answers: Although
Rava and Rabbah argue whether we follow a person’s thought or his
actions (Menachos 64a), their argument only applies to sins between
man and G-d, where it is appropriate to be judged by one’s thoughts,
and even according to the one who rules that we go by the action, the
person still requires atonement from Hashem for his thoughts. This
would not apply, however, to sins between man and man, where the
basis of the prohibition is that he brings evil upon his friend, but all
poskim agree that if the act is good or if it causes good results for his
friend, we go by the act and not the intentions.
The Beis Yitzchak (Yoreh Deah, Part 1 #8:8) points out that in the
case of intending to eat pork and eating lamb instead, the person in-
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