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Motivations for malicious attacks may include, but are not limited to:


                          Financial gain.                      Revenge.
                          Fraud.                               Espionage.
                          Mischief.                            Theft.
                          Malice.                              Association with criminals.
                   Negative Impact

                   The impact of insiders exploiting a vulnerability can be categorized following the Committee of
                   Sponsoring  Organizations  of  the  Treadway  Commission  (COSO)  Enterprise  Risk  Management
                   Framework as financial, operational, compliance, and customer. It is common that one attack can
                   result in more than one impact category; for example, sabotage of critical information systems can
                   result in financial (cost to restore systems), operational (loss of productivity), and customer (poor
                   service during outage) impacts.

                   Insider threat profiles can be developed using the dimensions described in the previous sections
                   as shown in Figure 3.

                   Figure 3: Building an Insider Threat Profile


                                                     Profile 1                       Profile 2


                     Threat                          IT sabotage                      Theft of IP

                     Threat actor                  Former employee                 Current employee

                     Target                        Computer network                  Trade secrets

                      Motivation                    Malice (revenge)                 Financial gain

                      Negative Impact            Disruption to operations      Loss of competitive advantage




                   In addition, it is important that organizations rank potential risks related to insider threats using
                   factors such as likelihood of occurrence, velocity, and persistence to build a risk profile that reflects
                   the organization’s risk appetite and tolerance.

                   Risks should also be cross-referenced with potential actors to build inherent risk profiles for job
                   functions — such as system administrators, help desk operators, service providers — that require
                   access  to  data classified  as  sensitive, critical, or  confidential. Creating risk profiles by function
                   should enable management to implement controls that may help prevent and detect intentional
                   or unintentional attacks in a cost-effective way.






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