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satisfy the clear-statement rule, and it
is not enough that the interpretation be
Not all procedural requirements are plausible or that some observers might
jurisdictional requirements that mark the think the interpretation is better. It con-
boundaries of a court’s judicial authority. cluded that the IRS’s interpretation was
not clear. In addition, the Court deter-
mined, contrary to the IRS’s argument,
a requirement is not made jurisdictional
by the mere presence in the same section
jurisdiction over petitions for review requirements that mark the boundaries of a statute of a jurisdictional provision
of CDP determinations and that the of a court’s judicial authority. Instead, (Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical
provision imposes a 30-day deadline many procedural requirements simply Center, 568 U.S. 145 (2013)). “Rather
to file those petitions. The question for instruct a party to take certain proce- than proximity, what is needed is a clear
the Court was whether Sec. 6330(d)(1) dural steps at certain specified times tie between the deadline and the juris-
limits the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to without making compliance with those dictional grant,” the Court stated.
petitions filed within the 30-day period. steps a condition of the court’s authority The Court also rejected the IRS’s
The answer to this question depended to hear the case. This distinction is im- contentions that the jurisdictional nature
on the meaning of “such matter.” portant, the Court stated, because juris- of the provision was clarified by the
Boechler contended that “such dictional requirements cannot be waived nearby provision, Sec. 6330(e)(1). It
matter” refers only to the immediately or forfeited, must be raised by courts further determined that the timing of
preceding phrase: a “petition [to] the Tax without prompting from the parties to the enactment of Sec. 6330(d)(1), which
Court for review of such determination,” a case, and do not allow for equitable occurred when Congress was aware of
making the filing deadline independent exceptions. The Court, citing Arbaugh v. lower court cases regarding a similar
of the jurisdictional grant. The IRS Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006), noted provision, Sec. 6213(a), did not have
argued that “such matter” refers to the that a clear statement by Congress that a any bearing on whether the provision
entire first clause of the sentence, thus procedural requirement is jurisdictional was jurisdictional.
applying to the deadline and granting is required for a procedural requirement Regarding equitable tolling, the
jurisdiction only over petitions filed to be jurisdictional (the clear-statement Court, citing Irwin v. Department of
within that time. Under this interpreta- rule). Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990),
tion, the deadline is jurisdictional. Looking at the text of Sec. 6330(d)(1), found that equitable tolling presump-
The IRS further argued that even if the Court found that, while the phrase tively applies to nonjurisdictional
the provision were found to be nonjuris- “such matter” lacks a clear grammatical limitation periods and that nothing
dictional, equitable tolling should not antecedent in the statute, Boechler’s rebutted that presumption with respect
follow. In support of this proposition, it interpretation was more plausible than to Sec. 6330(d)(1).
cited Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347 (1997), in the IRS’s. The broader statutory context, The IRS, citing Brockamp, in which
which the Court found the Sec. 6511 moreover, also supports considering the the Court held equitable tolling did
limitation period on filing claims for limit nonjurisdictional, the Court said, not apply to the Sec. 6511 refund claim
credit or refund does not allow for equi- noting that other, contemporaneously deadline, argued that equitable tolling
table tolling. enacted and similar time limits make should not apply to the Sec. 6330(d)(1)
their jurisdictional intent much more ex- deadline. The Court, however, found
The Supreme Court’s decision plicit. For example, Sec. 6404(g)(1) and Brockamp did not support the IRS’s
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Sec. 6015(e)(i)(A) both couch the Tax argument, because Sec. 6511 and
Circuit’s decision, holding that the Court’s jurisdiction as conditional, the Sec. 6330(d)(1) differ from one
Sec. 6330(d)(1) deadline was not juris- former stating “if such action is brought another in both expression and scope.
dictional and was subject to equitable within 180 days” and the latter “if such The Sec. 6511 deadline is stated in
tolling, and remanding the case to the petition is filed during the 90-day pe- “unusually emphatic form” and “detailed
Eighth Circuit for a determination of riod.” “These provisions accentuate the technical language” with numerous ex-
whether Boechler was entitled to equita- lack of comparable clarity in §6330(d)(1),” ceptions, none of which is present
ble tolling based on the facts of the case. the Court stated. in Sec. 6330(d)(1). And far fewer
The Court explained that not all pro- The Court also found that the inter- taxpayers are affected by Sec. 6330(d),
cedural requirements are jurisdictional pretation of a statute must be clear to which “serves a far more limited and

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