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Foundations and Standards
Grown from the need to deal with complexity in
the aerospace and defense industries, systems en-
gineering practices have been based primarily on
experience — trial and error. Over time, heuristics Today’s researchers are revisiting current sys-
were developed to tackle complex problems sys- tems engineering practices to ground them
SYSTEMS tematically and holistically. This systems engineer-
ENGINEERING ing body of knowledge today is documented in in a sound foundation built on mathematical
BODY OF theory and science. Further development of
KNOWLEDGE a broad array of standards, handbooks, academic this theoretical foundation is needed to allow
literature, and web-resources, focusing on a variety systems engineering to expand into new
of domains. A concerted effort is being made to domains and deal with increased complexity,
continually improve, update and further organize without having to repeat a costly trial-and-
this body of knowledge.
error learning process.
Current Systems Engineering Practices
and Challenges
Current systems engineering practice, based on stakeholders, but in the future, the systems com-
well-defined processes and innovative analytic munity must tackle many new fundamental inter-
approaches, has demonstrated significant value to disciplinary and integration-related challenges.
FIVE Mission complexity is growing faster than our
SYSTEMS 1 ability to manage it . . . increasing mission risk 4 Knowledge and investment are lost between
ENGINEERING from inadequate specifications and incom- projects . . . increasing cost and risk: dampen-
CHALLENGES ing the potential for true product lines.
plete verification.
Adapted from Todd
Bayer, Jet Propulsion
Laboratory
2 System design emerges from pieces, rather 5 Technical and programmatic sides of projects
than from architecture . . . resulting in systems
are poorly coupled . . . hampering effective
that are brittle, difficult to test, and complex
and expensive to operate. project risk-based decision making.
Most major disasters such as Challenger and
3 life cycle phase boundaries . . . increasing 6 Columbia have resulted from failure to recognize
Knowledge and investment are lost at project
and deal with risks. The Columbia Accident In-
development cost and risk of late discovery
of design problems vestigation Board determined that the preferred
approach is an “independent technical authority”.
20 • The Current State Copyright 2014 International Council on Systems Engineering

