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                                                                                               Commentary

                  LLDC & Fragile States Index (FSI)

                        Using the UK (FSI score = c 38) and the USA (FSI score = 38) as a reference point
                        15 of Africa’s 16 LLDC have a FSI score twice as high as that of the UK or the USA


                  LLDC & Fractionalisation

                  (Author : These figures measure ‘diversity’ but in essence may give some indication of the
                  propensity of a country’s population to ‘fracture’ )

                                           Type of Diversity
                        LLDC             Ethnic     Linguistic
                        Uganda              0.93       0.92
                        Chad                0.86       0.86

                        CAR                 0.83       0.83
                        Zambia              0.78       0.87
                        Burkina Faso        0.74       0.72

                        Ethiopia            0.72       0.81
                        Mali                0.69       0.84
                        Malawi              0.67       0.6

                        Niger               0.65       0.65
                        Zimbabwe            0.39       0.45
                                                          *****

                  LLDC & the number of coups since independence
                        5 of Africa’s 16 LLDC are also some of the countries most prone to coups

                       Burkina Faso                    10 coups
                       Burundi                          6 coups

                       Chad                            6 coups
                       Ethiopia                        5 coups
                       Central African Republic  5 coup


                  See the following :

                        Inequality, Coup-Proofing and Civil Wars
                        Using data on 148 countries between 1960 and 2008, I find that inequality

                        increases the overall risk of irregular leader removal but that its effect differs
                        across different forms of violence. In particular, while inequality fosters coups, it
                        has no discernible effect on the likelihood of civil war onset. I also provide

                        evidence consistent with my causal mechanisms:
                        (1) inequality creates greater threat to the rulers by fueling political instability;

                        (2) inequality reduces coup-proofing; and
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