Page 23 - Nile Explorer Issue 006

The official justification for the military Support for Jubaland In 2011, he struck another deal, this Ogadens, the largest Somali clan, whose The dispute could have been resolved For decades, Somalia has regarded
intervention was the pursuit of Alongside the military intervention, time with Nairobi, and the following members also live in southern Ethiopia amicably had Kenyan officials taken the Kenya as a neutral arbiter compared
al-Shabab members who allegedly Kenya has also involved itself in the year, his militia, backed by Kenyan and have a fraught with the government, issue seriously and had they regarded with Ethiopia which Somalis have
abducted aid workers in northern maelstrom of Somali domestic politics. troops, managed to expel al-Shabab is creating unnecessary tension. their Somali counterparts with some resented for its multiple military inter-
Kenya and kidnapped tourists along the from Jubaland's capital, Kismayo, which modicum of respect rather than assum- ventions. The overarching danger is
coast. Its principal vehicle of involvement in is also a strategic port city. Thus, Kenya is not only endangering its ing Somalia is a failed state incapable of that, in the end, Kenya's intervention
Somalia is Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed relationship with the Somali govern- mounting any defence. and meddling in Somalia's internal
The intervention has since degenerated Islam, also known as Madobe, an Over the next two years, Madobe ment but also with Ethiopia, a neigh- affairs, coupled with the self-aggran-
into an occupation. Currently, there are Islamist militia commander from the presided over clan reconciliation and in bour and a major regional power, with As a result, the case eventually ended up disement of a bubbling and venal elite,
more than 3,600 Kenyan troops in Somali Ogaden clan. 2015, with Kenyan backing, he was whom it has a decades-old defence pact at the International Court of Justice could ruin Kenyan-Somali relations.
Somalia, primarily deployed in the elected president of Jubaland. In the to ensure regional stability and curb (ICJ), which last year decided to delay its
semi-autonomous southern Somali Madobe is seen as a rather controversial 2019 presidential election in the Somali irredentism. ruling to 2020 to let the two sides nego- This will also undermine the authority
region of Jubaland. figure, having switched sides in Soma- semi-autonomous state, Nairobi again tiate further. and capacity of the federal Somalia
lia's civil war multiple times. He was supported his candidacy, despite the fact The maritime dispute government to administer the country,
Over the past eight years, the Kenyan part of various Islamist armed groups that the Somali government opposed it. If Kenya's original sin was the 2011 Instead of correcting their earlier especially if AMISOM troops depart as
forces have been accused of committing since the 1990s. He has fought against intervention, its natural outcome is the mistakes, Kenya's ministry of foreign scheduled by December 2020.
various human rights violations against the government in Mogadishu as an ally Kenya's backing for Madobe has needless maritime dispute with Soma- affairs officers dug in their heels and
civilians and being involved in illicit of al-Shabab for years and was involved revealed that all along it was not only lia. Both Nairobi and Mogadishu claim a started engaging in petty moves like The net winner of these squabbling and
smuggling activities. The Somali with militants seen as supportive of the interested in containing al-Shabab, but narrow triangle of about 100,000 square denying Somali officials entry into the reckless diplomacy will be al-Shabab,
government has demanded that Kenyan Ogaden National Liberation Front in establishing a "sphere of influence" kilometres off their coasts in the Indian country and reintroducing flight which will continue to enjoy enough
troops leave, but it has not followed up (ONLF), a separatist group who has through Jubaland - a satellite statelet, Ocean. The territory supposedly has oil stopovers in Wajir for security checks space to launch attacks in Kenya and
with any serious effort to expel them, fought for Somali self-determination in remote-controlled from Nairobi. and gas deposits. for all flights to and from Somalia, within Somalia. The ultimate loser will
given its own limited capacity to eastern Ethiopia. substituting petulance for diplomacy. be the Somali people who have endured
provide security. This misguided support for Jubaland, decades of conflict.
In 2007, a year after Ethiopia sent however, is something anyone with a Article first featured on Alazeera.com.
At the same time, the Kenyan military troops to Somalia to back the TFG basic understanding of the dynamic in
presence has done little to secure Kenya against the Islamist insurgency, Madobe the Horn of Africa would have coun-
from al-Shabab's attacks or Somalia was hit by a US bombing and captured selled against. For the fragile govern-
itself for that matter. In fact, violence by the Ethiopians, who offered him a ment in Mogadishu, the strengthening
has escalated since the intervention. political deal. He accepted to join the of Jubaland means the weakening of its
TFG in 2009, but shortly after he powers.
Kenya has witnessed a number of deserted his new post and with his Ras
large-scale al-Shabab operations, like Kamboni militia joined al-Shabab in For Ethiopia, Kenya's interference in a
the ones in Westgate Mall in 2013, and their fight against government and region predominantly populated by the
the Garissa University in 2015, which African Union troops.
took the lives of hundreds of civilians, as
well as numerous low-grade and low
casualty ones.

Since October, there have been on
average two al-Shabab attacks every
week in Kenya and Somalia. In the first
half of this month alone, the armed
group raided a military camp used by
Kenyan and US soldiers in southern
Kenya and then launched four other •
attacks, killing 10 civilians.
•
•
•

The intervention has revealed the
•

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/
• /

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underbelly of Kenya's security policy, its •  
failed military strategy and the inability
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@ € ‚
to police its own borders.

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