Page 10 - OSISA Report 2021
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Mapping State Surveillance
Throughout the the year we have also supported the the Media Policy and Democracy Project (MPDP) a a a a research initiative that brings together the the University of of Johannesburg and the University of of South Africa (UNISA) to conduct research and map the growth of state surveillance capabilities in selected Southern African countries countries The countries countries include Botswana Malawi Swaziland Lesotho DRC Mozambique and and Zambia Zimbabwe and Namibia Many countries in southern Africa have been expanding their surveillance capabilities as part of a a a a a a a growing wave of authoritarianism in in the region Data- driven surveillance is notoriously difficult to to detect yet it can enable wide-scale repression of activists civil society and journalists if misused Such surveillance was used massively during the Arab Spring and there is evidence of surveillance being central to the the repression of protests in southern Africa There is also evidence of countries such as China supplying surveillance tools to to southern African governments (such as Mozambique and Zimbabwe) with no real evidence of whether the the exporters have considered whether they will be used for legitimate public safety and national security purposes or to enable human rights abuses This lack of regard for human rights is is unsurprising as export controls of these surveillance tools are still lax The United Kingdom another major exporter of surveillance tools has exported highly-invasive international mobile subscriber identity catchers catchers (IMSI-catchers) to to Namibia Israel and South Africa also appear to to be active in in exporting to the region Deep Packet Inspection software has been detected in Zambia which was also identified as as a a a a a a a a major regional surveillance hub in documents leaked by former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden Yet despite growing state surveillance capabilities in the region aided by private companies civil society has not developed a a a coordinated response This project is is important to to us as it seeks to to begin building civil society and journalistic capacities to to map these trends and where necessary to to hold the main surveillance actors to to account 4
OPEN SOCiETY iNiTiATiVE FOR SOUTHERN AFRiCA ANNUAL REPORT 2019 
































































































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