Page 6 - Aerotech News and Review, March 4, 2022

AIAA, SAMPE host AV Aviation History Symposium

by Larry Grooms an RFP was released in 1969. North ground level, far below the 10,000-
special to Aerotech news
American Rockwell won the contract foot ejection order. Waniczek said that
AEROSPACE VALLEY, Calif.— the following year, and Southern Cal- when the crash became inevitable “we
When people involved in making or ifornia’s High Desert communities had 3,500 feet of altitude and 29 sec-
studying cutting edge flight test his- came to love the graceful lines and onds to ejection.”
tory came together in a Zoom history throaty road of the white bird called
symposium on Feb. 26, the sum of Lancer. Lessons Learned from B-1A/74-
their individual experiences might be There was jubilation when the first 0159
expressed as, “failing to learn or just B-1A rolled out in 1974, but three • Beware of Warning Fatigue, a
dismissing the lessons of history can days before Christmas that year, the 1980s name for how we become
ruin your whole day.” program contract was scaled back to numbed to incessant danger warnings
Setting the stage for the more than four planes. But the bottom fell out which we come to regard as unreli-
four-hour program was nationally rec- when three years later, President Jim- able false alarms. The B-1A had warn-
ognized aerospace historian Richard P. my Carter cancelled the B-1 program ing lights that flashed on an obscured
Hallion, PhD, whose theme, Breaking to survive because he didn’t want his with the provision that the four could panel that frequently sent needless sig-
the Sound Barrier: 75th Anniversary Other things on her list included: tombstone epitaph to say, “He died continue to be flown until April 1981. nals. It should have alerted the crew to
Perspective,” broke the usual pattern • Looking out for improper installa- with his sneakers on.” Since the mis- That deadline never came, as newly the fuel transfer failure.
for X-1 lectures. tion of parts, panels and other things sion wasn’t supposed to leave the run- elected President Ronald Reagan took • Greater attention should be given
Jumping past common knowledge that might fall off, such as the fuselage way, the pilot didn’t bother with flight office in January 1981 and restored the to crew composition, especially to
of what happened over Muroc Army panel that harmlessly landed on a free- boots. program with the new model B-1Bs. close and clear communications and
Airbase on Oct. 14, 1947, Hallion way when the first C-17 lifted off on More serious and mysterious was The downside was the size of the or- working relationships between senior
started his history of supersonic flight its first flight from Long Beach Airport discovery and investigation of the der. The original contract was for 244 people and newbies.
where it began: Kitty Hawk, N.C., in to Edwards. F-16s unpredictable and intermit- A models. But most were never built. • What we have here is a failure to
1903. He tracked global technology’s • Avoid jumping to conclusions tent entry into what is called a deep The new contract was for 100 bomb- communicate. About 95 percent of the
reach for ever faster aircraft through when tracing a problem’s source, as stall. Typically occurring in flights ers, and all were delivered to the Air time we are talking past each other in
two world wars, the jet age, rocket occurred when an inflight refueling at higher transonic speed, and at alti- Force. everyday life. Air crews and all crews
planes and current events — new problem was briefly misdiagnosed as tudes between 16,000 and 25,000 feet Waniczek, who went to the Test Pi- need to talk together, share experi-
quests in the hypersonic flight regime. mechanical rather than pilot-induced AGL, the deep stall announced itself lot School in 1982, went back to the ences and ask questions.
“Breaking the Sound Barrier” in the osculation. by pitching nose to tail and ultimately B-1 test ships. Of the early B-1s still • Swallow your pride. When you’re
program title, set up the audience for • Be flexible, but don’t let pressure entering an inverted or rolling spin out flying, he remembers that only 0159 out of control, get out of the cockpit
recurring moments of myth-busting or politics interfere with doing the job control. used the crew ejection capsule which before it’s too late. Sure, it’s only hu-
and memory reevaluation beginning right. Recovery methods ultimately in- separated from the fuselage by ex- man nature to want to save the day
with the revelation that there was • Take advantage of downtime when cluded activating the manual pitch plosive charges and parachuted back and the plane but delaying the ejection
never a tangible barrier to be broken the aircraft breaks. override to bring up the nose, rock- to earth. The other B-1s had separate decision when it’s hopeless cuts the
when an aircraft flew at Mach 1 speed. ing the nose and tail to get the nose ejection seats for crew. odds of survival.
“The Sound Barrier was a myth,” he Artemio (“Tim”) Cacanindin, cur- at a high enough angle of attack and He remembers the flight test mis- • Take a hard look at the point se-
said. But the Mach 1 ride by Chuck rently Deputy Director/Director of sufficient forward propulsion to nose- sion seemed routine at first. But what quences of test program cards, and
Yeager both validated rocket propul- Projects at the Global Combined Test over and dive to recovery. Also tested he described as seemingly little things test point set-ups versus test execu-
sion and the design approach for the Force at Edwards, occupied one of was use of tail or underbelly-mounted popped up as time went on. tion. The practice of Control Rooms
By the end of his narrative on what
X-15’s reach into hypersonic speed. those edge of the seat, white-knuck- drogue parachutes to put the aircraft
Creating a program-unifying ques- led, BP-elevating management jobs into a nose down position for control happened that terrible day, Otto Wan- going on a break while the test air-
tion for each of the three presenters for the F-16 High Angle of Attack recover or a soft flat landing on one iczek had already amassed his list of craft continues its trip to the next test
Lessons Learned, which turned out to
who followed, Hallion’s historical Test Program. of the R-2508 Spin Areas at Edwards. point fails to support the complete test
overture included his own short list Lockheed Martin’s high perfor- In a Phase II spin test, the drogue be the longest list of the day. flight.
Takeoff was delayed two hours by
of What Were the Lessons Learned? mance, bantam weight, single-engine, parachute mounted on the tail of Lock- the sudden discovery that two tires had • Staffing for the Control Room
multi-mission Fighting Falcon was al-
Observing that among all the many heed Martin test pilot John Fergoine’s to be changed. Two minimum airspeed should be guided by the necessity of
lessons learned from the history of ready considered to be the leader of F-16 failed to deploy, but his piloting calibration passes of the tower had to maintaining a fully trained-up staff
aviation, “There are some fundamen- the advanced technology pack when skills saved himself and his aircraft af- so that the loss of a senior member
tal truths that need to be repeated. “ it first flew in 1974. It was the first ter he did something that became the be done. A power check with all four doesn’t require using a rookie to fill
engines had to be repeated because the
Hallion said, “Lessons learned are production American fighter with fly- Number One Item on Cacanidin’s list a crucial job.
perishable,” and argues that people by-wire control systems and first with of Lessons Learned. speed brakes weren’t set correctly. • While the Inquiry Board decision
Then came that moment when
need to get away from the notion that a sidestick controller. As the cockpit video cam shows manual operation of pumps failed to on its investigation of the B-1A crash
So well designed and sturdily built
the history of scientific inquiry is no was the F-16 that by the mid-1980s what Fergoine is seeing as the F-16 rebalance the fuel load for trim while cited Air Crew Error as the proximate
longer useful. was spinning wildly, he momentarily swinging the wings back for superson- cause for the loss of the airplane, there
Next up was Eileen Bjorkman, now owners of the proud bird began hang- released his grip on the control stick ic flight and forward for slow speeds, might be an argument to be made that
executive director of the Air Force ing bigger and better toys beneath the and reached up. In seconds the video takeoffs and landings. In short, the some others behind the scenes deserve
Test Center at Edwards AFB, and 30 wings and alongside and beneath the screen shows the aircraft is recovering nose went up causing loss of forward to share the finding.
slim fuselage.
years ago a young captain and pilot Cacanindin said adding such vital to a normal flight condition. momentum, began to yaw heavily, ro- The symposium was jointly pro-
assigned to the Flight Test Office team features as two LANTIRN system Lessons Learned: tated laterally, pitched and rolled. duced by the Antelope Valley Section
responsible for the first flight and early pods for day or night operations in all- Airplanes are designed and built to Waniczek said, “the airplane was of the American Institute of Aeronau-
flight testing of the McDonald Doug- weather with Terrain-Following Radar FLY – not to CRASH. When all else trying to fly its best” right up to the tics and Astronautics, the High Des-
is failing, sometimes it is wise to put
las C-17 Globemaster III. and Forward-Looking Infra-Red tar- point where its nose went to 70 de- ert Chapter of the Society for the Ad-
Her list of Lessons Learned from geting for the aircraft’s on-board fire one’s faith in the airplane’s natural grees. Flight records showed the crew vancement of Materials & Process En-
capacity to self-correct its problems.
that experience was led by “not letting control and target illumination kept And from Symposium attendee Dr. escape system was activated when gineering, the Society of Experimental
your guard down about simple things,” test pilots busy. the bomber was at 1,505 feet above Test Pilots and many other groups.
like the 50-cent part that could bring Along the way, HiAoA test pilots Tim Jorris: “Let go of the stick.”
down a $100 million airplane.
discovered some unpleasant wrinkles, B-1A 74-0159 / Flight #2 of 127 /
including a sidestick controller glitch Aug. 29, 1984
that denied pilots the tactile sensitiv- In an emotionally moving closing
ity to accurately control the aircraft. segment of the symposium, one of
Even though the problem was quickly three crewmen aboard that final flight
corrected with a programming adjust- of the B-1A that day, Flight Test En-
ment, Cacanindin recalled the expe- gineer Otto Waniczek is alone among
rience of an early morning taxi test the two crash survivors to pass along
in which a replacement pilot’s F-16 the account for future generations.
became suddenly airborne, leaving Senior Pilot Air Force Maj. Dick
the runway and flying erratically be- Reynolds subsequently passed, while
fore the pilot gained enough control Co-pilot Doug Benefield perished in
to land. Calling the incident Flight the crash.
Zero, Cacanidin remembers the sub- The B-1 program concept was
stitute pilot saying he was motivated studied and debated for a decade until
Aerotech News and Review
6 www.aerotechnews.com ........ facebook.com/aerotechnewsandreview March 4, 2022