Page 77 - UK Continuing Airworthiness Regulations (Consolidated) 201121

ANNEX I - Continuing Airworthiness Requirements

should be performed during scheduled/extensive maintenance. Appendix III to GM1
M.B.303(b) provides guidance on KREs that can be used for planning and/or analysis of
the inspections.
2. The survey should be a ‘deep cut’ through the elements or systems selected.
3. The record of an ACAM inspection should identify which KREs were inspected.
M.B.303(b) AMC3 Aircraft continuing airworthiness monitoring
KEY RISK ELEMENTS
1. The following KREs should be used for aircraft continuing airworthiness monitoring:
(a) Type design and changes to type design
(b) Airworthiness limitations
(c) Airworthiness Directives
(d) Aircraft documents
(e) Flight Manual
(f) Mass & Balance
(g) Markings & placards
(h) Operational requirements
(i) Defect management
(j) Aircraft Maintenance Programme
(k) Component control
(l) Repairs
(m) Records
2. These KREs and their detailed components should be adapted to the complexity of the
aircraft type being surveyed by retaining only those items that are applicable and relevant
for the particular aircraft type.
3. The further information regarding ‘KEY RISK ELEMENTS’ can be found in Appendix III to
GM1 M.B.303(b).
M.B.303(b) GM1 Aircraft continuing airworthiness monitoring (ACAM)
KEY RISK ELEMENTS
The KREs define the scope of continuing airworthiness. The list of KREs is intended to provide the
basis for planning and control of the ACAM survey programme. It will ensure that the programme
covers all aspects of continuing airworthiness. While it is not required to cover all KREs during a given
inspection, the ACAM survey programme needs to ensure that there is no omission, i.e. certain KRE
are never inspected.
The further information on ‘KEY RISK ELEMENTS’ can be found in Appendix III to GM1 M.B.303(b).
M.B.303(d) AMC Aircraft continuing airworthiness monitoring (ACAM)
FINDINGS ANALYSIS
1. The process should analyse the findings, or combination thereof, in order to identify:
(a) the root causes and their recurrence;
(b) the potential impact on flight safety of the individual aircraft or aircraft fleet on the
national register, including hazard identification and risk mitigation; and
(c) further necessary actions at the level of the organisation(s) or individual(s)
interacting with the continuing airworthiness of the aircraft or aircraft fleet.
2. The outcome of the analysis should be used for the further adjustment of the ACAM
programme as well as for the purpose of M.B.303(e), (f) and (g).
3. The purpose of this process is not to analyse individual findings, but to address systemic
issues or issues that become apparent at individual, corporate or aggregate level.
M.B.304 Revocation and suspension
The CAA shall:
(a) suspend an airworthiness review certificate on reasonable grounds in the case of potential
safety threat, or;
(b) suspend or revoke an airworthiness review certificate pursuant to M.B.903(1).
M.B.305 Aircraft technical log system
(a) The CAA shall approve the initial aircraft technical log system required by point M.A.306.
(b) To enable the organisation to implement changes to the aircraft technical log system
without prior CAA approval, the CAA shall approve the relevant procedure referred to in
point CAMO.A.300(c) of Annex Vc, or point M.A.704(c) of this Annex or point CAO.A.025(c)
of Annex Vd.
Section B Subpart D Maintenance Standards
Reference Description
Section B Subpart E Components

Reference Description
Section B Subpart F Maintenance Organisation
Reference Description
M.B.602 Initial Approval
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