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42                         Introduction

            at some later time t  by saying “Wellington,” we infer that sometime between
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            t  and t  he learned that Wellington is the capital. The situation is similar with
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            1
            respect to skills. If a person cannot drive a car at time t , but turns out to be
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            a skilled driver at time t , we infer that he learned how to drive a car in the
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            meantime. Evidence for learning is essentially comparative, consisting of dif-
            ferences between two or more behaviors (actions, utterances) occurring some
            time apart. But the change in behavior is not in and of itself learning.
               If behavior is generated by processes operating on knowledge representa-
            tions, then a change in action or discourse must have been preceded by some
            change in the underlying knowledge. It is the act of revising the representation
            of New Zealand by replacing the capital is Auckland with the capital is Wellington
            that constitutes learning. The change in behavior – the different answer given
            to the question what is the name of the capital? – is an overt expression of that
            internal change. The distinction between a change in knowledge and its overt
            expression is necessary because the person might learn the correct name of the
            New Zealand capital but live the rest of his life without ever using that piece of
            knowledge; nobody ever asks him, New Zealand never comes up in conversa-
            tion and so on. The situation is similar with respect to a skill such as driving a
            car. The change of interest is a change in the person’s representation of the skill;
            any observable change in his driving behavior is a consequence of that inter-
            nal change. The relevant unit changes are changes in knowledge, not changes in
            behavior.


                           The Repertoire of Learning Mechanisms

            Sciences differ in an interesting way with respect to their repertoires of unit
            changes. Some fields of research attribute all their phenomena to a single type of
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            change.  Adherents of the mechanical world view in the 17th and 18th centuries
            tried to explain all of physics through the motions of physical bodies and the
            forces they exert on each other. Chemists explain all chemical reactions in terms
            of the rearrangement of atoms through the breaking and forming of atomic
            bonds. Earth scientists, in contrast, draw upon a rich and varied repertoire of
            change mechanisms: glaciation in response to astronomical cycles, plate tecton-
            ics, erosion caused by water freezing in cracks, the actions of wind and water on
            soil and sand and so on.  Whether a science will turn out to need a sparse or a
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            rich repertoire of change mechanisms cannot be known ahead of investigation.
               Tradition has handed down a long list of suggestions about the basic pro-
            cesses of knowledge change. I refer to them as learning mechanisms. Perhaps
            association, the idea that knowledge changes by the creation of a link between
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