Page 127 - The Chief Culprit

88 y e Chief Culprit

Furthermore, tanks need repair, and not only in stationary repair shops but in the field. For
this one needs to have mobile tank-repair shops and even mobile tank-repair factories. is
again means more men and automobiles.
But in order to repair a tank it must be towed under enemy fire out of the ditch,
swamp, or battlefield and taken to the mobile repair shop. For this one needs specialized
repair-evacuation units.
In order to repair a tank in field conditions, the necessary spare parts must constantly
be supplied to the battle area. So, our column of tanks is followed by a long tail without
which the tank units cannot act.
Tanks need to be defended and protected in close battle; the success of tanks needs to
be retained. is is done by the motorized infantry. Every tank division needs its own regi-
ment of motorized infantry, and every corps needs its own motorized infantry division. Tank
action needs to be supported by artillery fire. For this we have guns and mortars. e action
of tanks, infantry, and artillery needs to be protected. For this we have anti-tank cannons. All
this needs to be organized and coordinated. Troop command needs to have a flow of informa-
tion through thousands of different channels. is is provided by communication units. All
this means more automobiles and more men.
e Soviet standard for the year 1940 was as follows: for the bare necessities of supply-
ing the operation of 1,000 tanks (one mechanized corps—1,031 tanks), 36,080 soldiers and
officers, 358 guns and mortars, 266 armored cars, 352 tractors, and 5,165 automobiles were
needed. is is not counting reinforcements, air force, and the rear formation that had to
supply this entire mass of troops.
We thought that one tank just needed three men, but in reality it needed thirty-six
men. e war later showed that the prewar calculations were too low. In order to maintain
the action of each tank on the battlefield one needed seventy to eighty men per tank, twice as
many automobiles as supposed before the war, and thrice as much artillery.
But even using the lowered prewar calculations, to fulfill Tukhachevski’s program the
tank troops would have needed to have 1.8 million to 3.6 million soldiers and officers, 18,000
to 36,000 tractors, as many guns and mortars, 13,000 to 26,000 armored cars, and 250,000
to 500,000 trucks.
e German armed forces at that time counted 100,000 soldiers, officers, and gener-
als. Meanwhile, Tukhachevski envisioned the Red Army having half a million men just to
drive the automobiles in the tank divisions. Not counting the drivers of tanks, artillery pulls,
and armored cars, plus commanders, communications officers, sappers, intelligence, and all
the rest.
Perhaps Tukhachevski thought the tank troops could do without automobiles?
e Soviet Union at that time could not have devoted half a million automobiles to
the tank troops. It could not have given a quarter million either. It could not have devoted so
many automobiles not just to the tank troops, but to the entire armed force. And if it had,
then agriculture, the transportation system, construction, and industry would have been left
without automobiles and tractors. If all automobiles were given to the tank troops, then how
much fuel, oil, and spare parts would those cars have used up?
And how would such tank troops have been manned? ere was no mandatory univer-
sal draft in the Soviet Union at that time. Should one have been instituted? is was already
beyond the duties of the Chief of Staff of the Red Army.