Page 123 - The Chief Culprit
P. 123

84  y   e Chief Culprit


                      On the other hand, all these strategists would have been incapable of leading the people
                 into war. It is well known that an army that has sullied its uniforms with the blood of its own
                 people is incapable of fighting against outside enemies.  e primary reason for the decay
                 of any army is its use against its own people. Everyone who has actively participated in this
                 could no longer be a troop leader.
                      Here is another pearl from the treasury of strategist Tukhachevski’s combat experience:

                      TO THE TROOPS’ CHIEF OF STAFF
                      For signature by Kakurin
                      By the Political Commission of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th districts
                      July 8, 1921
                        Defeated bandits are hiding in the forests and taking out their impotent rage on the
                      local population, burning bridges [and] damaging dams and other government prop-
                      erty. In the interest of securing the bridges, the Commission of the All-Russia Central
                      Executive Committee orders:
                           Immediately take from the population of villages located near important bridges
                      no less than five hostages, who in the event of damage done to the bridge are to be im-
                      mediately executed.
                           Under supervision of the Revolutionary Committees, the local residents are to
                      organize the defense of the bridges from bandit attacks; the local residents are also to
                      take on the responsibility of repairing the damaged bridges no later than within a 24-
                      hour deadline.
                            is order is to be widely distributed among all villages and towns.

                           Troop commander
                           Tukhachevski

                       e great strategist has strange logic: the bandits “are hiding in the forests and taking
                 out their impotent rage on the local population,” so Tukhachevski orders execution of hos-
                 tages taken out of this very same local population.
                      All of Tukhachevski’s experience can be narrowed down to two things: hostages and
                 executions. Meanwhile, the taking of hostages was forbidden by the Hague Convention of
                 1907. Hostage taking has always been considered the most serious war crime. A troop leader
                 who sullied his name with this sort of maneuver has always been despised. At Nuremberg and
                 all subsequent trials of German Nazis the practice of taking hostages was regarded as a war
                 crime and those guilty of it were sentenced to death by hanging.
                      So that would have been a proper place for Tukhachevski, Antonov-Ovseenko, and all
                 other war criminals—on the defendants’ bench at Nuremberg, in the company of Hermann
                 Goering, Wilhelm Keitell, Alfred Jodl, and others.
                      Tukhachevski encountered real enemy troops only once.  e Western front of the Red
                 Army under Tukhachevski’s command headed to the West with the intention of breaking
                 through to Germany and unleashing a Communist revolution. But Tukhachevski did not
                 reach Germany. His hordes were defeated near Warsaw by the Polish army commanded by
                 Pilsudsky.
                       e defeat was shameful and total. Tukhachevski became enraged. We have been taught
   118   119   120   121   122   123   124   125   126   127   128