Page 121 - The Chief Culprit
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82 y e Chief Culprit
a time of total decay in the old country and army. Commanders for the most part were not
appointed, but elected by soldiers. Understandably, the soldiers did not choose those who
would demand discipline and order, but those who would not stop them from doing what
soldiers like to do. e soldiers quickly ousted the commanders they did not like, and elected
new ones. In order to keep one’s position, one had to do nothing, and close one’s eyes to all
the soldiers’ crimes and disorderly conduct. e soldiers liked Tukhachevski and elected him
to be company commander. He did not “command” for long. An army with such a com-
mand system could not last for long. It rotted and fell apart.
e Communists then began to form their armed forces, which they called the Red
Army. Junior officer Tukhachevski had a meeting with Lenin and Trotsky. What they talked
about is not known, but Tukhachevski was immediately appointed commander of the 1st
Army of the Eastern Front. Here, suddenly, surfaced Tukhachevski’s ferocious nature. e
Civil War in Russia was not only a war, but also a series of punitive expeditions against those
who did not want Communism. Tukhachevski declared all those who opposed the illegal
Communist leadership to be “bandits,” and viciously exterminated not only them but also
their relatives, their neighbors, and everyone who happened to come his way. e founda-
tion of Tukhachevski’s “strategy” was: the burning of villages, whippings, and mass shootings.
Tukhachevski phrased the main objective not only of the Civil War, but of any other war as
well, very clearly: “With an iron hand crush the local enemy classes.” Many of Tukhachevski’s
combat orders are not about how to use a clever maneuver to bypass the enemy and hit him
in the flank and rear, but about how many hostages are to be taken and when they are to be
executed. Here is an example:
ORDER
To the Plenipotentiary Commission of All-Russia
Central Executive Committee, # 16
City of Tambov
June 23, 1921
e experience of the first combat area shows a high predisposition for quick cleans-
ing from banditry through the following measures. Some localities with particu-
larly strong bandit tendencies are noted, and representatives of the region’s Political
Commission, of a Special Section, Sections of the Military Tribunal and Command,
together with units designed to conduct purges, are sent there. Upon their arrival,
they surround the area, take hostage 60–100 of the most prominent persons, and
introduce a siege. Entering and exiting the area must be forbidden during the course
of the operation. After this, the entire population of the area is gathered, and the
orders of the Commission of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee #130 and
#171 and the signed sentence for this area are read aloud. e residents are given 2
hours to give up the bandits and their weapons, as well as the bandits’ families, and
the population is told that in the event of refusal the abovementioned hostages will be
shot in 2 hours. If the population does not give up the bandits and weapons within
the two-hour time limit, they are once again rounded up and the hostages are shot
before their eyes, after which new hostages are taken and those gathered are once