Page 117 - The Chief Culprit

78 y e Chief Culprit

scenario was not viable. Instead, it was Hitler who carried out a preemptive strike. e
Communists’ strategy to strike the first blow was aborted. Stalin’s carefully designed plans
to mount a massive offensive air assault became irrelevant in the desperate rush to fight a
defensive war.
For many years after World War II it was not clear what had happened to the Soviet
airborne forces. A Western military historian writing in 1978 noted: “In June 1941, when
Germany invaded Russia, the latter had more than one million trained parachutists. It seems
extraordinary that the investment this represented was not used constructively during the
war.” For Soviet paratroopers, it was immediately clear why Stalin’s “extraordinary invest-
21
ment” was not used “constructively.” In 1941 the chief of staff of the Southwestern front,
Lieutenant General M. A. Purkaev, astutely explained the reality created by the German
surprise attack. He told Colonel A. I. Rodimtsev: “Yes, the situation now is such, comrade
Rodimtsev, that it is easy to find one’s way behind the enemy’s lines without a paratroop drop.
Some of our units and even large formations are already encircled.” 22
In defensive war there is nowhere to jump. One must stop enemy tanks. All five air
assault corps of the first wave were sent to stem the German tide. However, everything had
already been prepared for the now-useless landing. Parachutes had been delivered to the air
base loading areas. Commander of the 4th Air Assault Corps Zhadov recalled how he sum-
moned Captain A. I. Goryachev, the aide to the chief of operations sector of the corps staff:
“‘Do you know, comrade captain, what is gold?’ He was dumbfounded by such an unantici-
pated question, but nevertheless answered: ‘I have an idea, but I never had any gold.’ ‘Not
true,’ I said to him. ‘A parachute was given to every Red Army soldier and commander. is
is our nation’s gold. Do you know where there are thousands of parachutes sitting out in the
open? In the forest, one kilometer east of the river Berezina. Organize the transportation of
this precious material to the rear.’” 23
Captain Goryachev carried out the order. He found trucks, and under machine-gun
fire from the advancing Germans, brought the parachutes to a safe place, for which he was
rewarded with a medal. But these parachutes were never used again.
An airborne force is a fine precision tool in war. Using it as a defense force instead of
regular infantry is to squander a precious asset. e paratroop units do not have the same
heavy and powerful weapons as regular infantry, so their resistance in defense is much lower
than that of regular infantry. Using paratroops to fight against tanks is the same as transport-
ing bricks in a Ferrari race car—expensive and ineffective. But it was necessary to fight back,
and the air assault corps were sent to the trenches to stop the tanks. Ten air assault corps,
100,000 men—150,000 if we count the separate brigades and reserve regiments. But where
were the million paratroopers mentioned by Pravda?
In the spring of 1942 the Red Army suffered several crushing defeats at the same time:
the 39th Army of Lieutenant General I. I. Maslennikov was surrounded and perished near
Rzhev; the 33rd Army of Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov perished after being surrounded
near Vyazma; the 2nd Shock Army of Lieutenant General A. A. Vlassov was cut off and en-
circled. ose who did not follow Vlassov’s example and surrender, perished. e Crimean
front was broken, during which the 44th, 47th, and 51st armies perished; and in the battle of
Kharkov the 6th, 9th, 28th, and 57th armies were destroyed, along with seven separate tank
and cavalry corps and a significant number of divisions, brigades, and regiments. ousands
of tanks and weapons and ample strategic resources were lost, and hundreds of thousands of