Page 116 - The Chief Culprit

Soviet Airborne Assault Troops and eir Mission y 77

drop hundreds of thousands of his airborne troops into Central and Western Europe in 1942,
the mass production of gliders should have been scheduled for spring of 1942.
Gliders deliver cargo and groups of assault troops without parachutes, while assault
forces with parachutes are delivered to the enemy’s rear by cargo warplanes. e best cargo
warplane in the world at the beginning of World War II was the legendary American Douglas
DC-3. is plane set the record for durability—fifty-five years of use. It was an extraordinary
plane for its time.
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e American Douglas DC-3, although under a different name (PS-84), formed the
core of Soviet war-transport aviation. In 1938, the U.S. government sold to Stalin the pro-
duction license and the necessary amount of the most complex equipment for its production.
Giants like Fokker and Mitsubishi also purchased licenses for the production of Douglas
aircraft, but could not produce them in mass without parts from America. Soviet industry,
on the other hand, was able to start mass production using Soviet parts—an important step
in the field of cargo aircraft. Before the war, the Soviet Union bought twenty Douglas units
from the United States, and in 1939 six identical aircraft were produced on Soviet soil. In
1940, fifty-one aircraft were produced; in 1941, 237 aircraft. During the entire war 2,419
DC-3s or Soviet PS-84/Li-2 planes came out of Soviet factories. 18
Aside from the DC-3, the Soviet Union had several hundred TB-3 strategic bombers,
which could also be used as cargo planes. All large-scale drops of paratroops in the 1930s
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were done from the TB-3. ere were enough of them to lift several thousand paratroopers
and heavy weapons, including tanks, armored cars, and artillery.
A Soviet air armada of gliders and transport planes would be easy prey for enemy fight-
ers if they did not secure complete air superiority. Soviet generals understood all this perfectly.
e most important document that guided the actions of the Red Army in war was the Field
Order (Polevoy Ustav—PU). At that time, the Field Order of 1939 was in action—PU-39.
e order clearly stated that to conduct a “deep penetration” and a mass drop of air assault
corps, the Soviet air force must dominate the skies. is field order, as well as air force battle
orders and “instruction on independent use of aviation,” foresaw the conduct in the begin-
ning of the war of a massive strategic operation that would crush the air force of the enemy.
According to the plans of Soviet commanders, the air forces of several fronts, naval aviation,
and fighter aviation were to participate in such an operation.
In December 1940 the highest-ranking commanders of the Red Army, at a secret meet-
ing with Stalin and members of the Politburo, discussed these operations in great detail. e
euphemism for a Soviet surprise attack on German air forces was “special operations at the
initial stage of war.” e commander of Soviet aviation, General P. V. Rychagov, stressed the
necessity of carefully concealing the preparations of Soviet aviation for carrying out a surprise
attack, in order to “find all enemy air forces on their bases.” Obviously, it would be impos-
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sible in a wartime situation to “find all enemy air forces on their bases.” It is only possible
during peacetime, when the enemy does not suspect any danger. It is impossible to first start
a war and then carry out a surprise attack on the majority of enemy air bases. It is possible to
carry out an attack during peacetime, but such an attack will mean war.
Stalin created so many air assault troops that it was possible to use them only in one
scenario: an air attack and a massive invasion. e Red Army had to begin the war, suddenly
and treacherously, by an attack of its air force against the enemy’s air bases. ousands of
paratroops would be dropped to seize and control key bases and strategic sites. Any other