Page 171 - The Chief Culprit

132 y e Chief Culprit

But this is not what is most important. e most important is the fact that at the very
beginning of the war almost all industry capable of producing new ammunition was lost.
“From August to November 1941, the German troops took 303 Soviet gunpowder, shell,
and missile factories, which had a production capability of supplying 101 million artillery
shells, 32 million mines, 24 million air bombs, [and] 3,600 tons of TNT. is constituted 85
percent of all output from the Ammunition Narkomat.” In addition to all this, the mobiliza-
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tion reserves of the most valuable raw materials were concentrated in those factories, includ-
ing lead, forged steel, and tin. All this went to Germany and was used against the Red Army.
But Stalin’s prewar potential was so great that he was able to rebuild his industries during the
course of the war behind the Volga River and in the Urals, and produce all that later was used
to defeat the German army.
When the Ammunition Narkomat was created, nobody was posing a threat to the
Soviet Union. Japan had a powerful air force and navy, but its land army was relatively small,
and it was engaged in a rather unpromising war in China. Japan had limited reserves of raw
materials. Soviet intelligence reported to the government that Japan could possibly decide
to wage a large war in order to seize raw material sources, but the Japanese were primarily
interested in those regions where the mining and purification of the materials was already set
up, because Japan needed those resources immediately. In other words, Japan would fight
to control the southern territories, and it would not venture into Siberia, where resources
were unlimited but where their mining and purification would take several years and huge
expenditures.
e Soviet General Staff, the government, and Stalin himself were not very afraid of
German aggression in early 1939. ere was no common border with Germany back then, so
Germany could not attack suddenly. e creation of the Ammunition Narkomat in January
1939 could not be a response to German war preparations. Soviet intelligence knew that at
that moment German industry was operating on a peacetime regime. In June 1939 the chief
of the GRU, Ivan Proskurov, reported to Stalin that Germany was unprepared for a large-
scale war: if Germany invaded Poland, it would use up its air-bomb supplies within ten days.
Germany had no reserves.
After the war, the book Results of World War II came out in Germany. Field Marshal K.
Kesselring, Colonel General H. Guderian, Colonel General L. Rendulic, Lieutenant General
E. Schneider, Admiral E. Godt, and others were among the authors of the book. When com-
paring the analysis made by Soviet intelligence and the actual events, we must acknowledge
that Soviet military intelligence was mistaken. e German supply of bombs ran out not after
ten days of war, but on the fourteenth day after the attack against Poland.
Apparently the best studies of the development of the German army during the reign
of the ird Reich were done by Major General B. Muller-Gillebrand. e general said that
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in 1939 the German High Command of the land troops demanded that a reserve of ammu-
nition be created that could last for four months of war. However, such reserves were never
created. If a four-month supply is taken as 100 percent, then there was in actuality only 30
percent of pistol cartridge reserves, enough for 36 days of war; 15 percent of ammunition for
mountain guns; 12 percent of mortar shells for light mortars, and 10 percent for heavy ones.
e best supplies were for the heavy field howitzers—there were enough shells to last for two
months of war. e worst case was with the tank shells. In September 1939 the main tank