Page 173 - The Chief Culprit

134 y e Chief Culprit

masses on narrow strips of territory and used in sudden, intense strikes. In the Stalingrad op-
eration, the Don front under Lieutenant General K. K. Rokossovsky broke through defenses
on a narrow strip of land—only twelve kilometers. Here, besides the tanks, twenty-four rifle
regiments supported by thirty-six artillery regiments led the breakthrough. Rokossovsky
concentrated 135 guns on every kilometer, and 167 weapons per kilometer in the primary
locations. During the course of the war, the concentration of artillery, tanks, infantry, and
aviation constantly increased. By the end of the war, the Soviet staffs began to use kilotons
as units of measurement for calculating the power of artillery attacks. Soviet artillery began
to speak the language of the atomic age.
In the Vistula-Oder operation, the Soviet command used 34,500 guns and mortars.
ey were not evenly distributed throughout the force, but rather concentrated on the strips
where the breakthrough was to occur. In the strip covered by the 3rd Guards Army, the con-
centration reached 420 weapons per kilometer. During the course of the war, the duration of
artillery softening-up constantly shrank, while artillery power grew. In the same operation,
in the area covered by the 5th Shock Army, the duration of softening-up was planned to
12
be reduced to 55 minutes. It began well, but after 25 minutes it was ended. Twenty-three
thousand tons of ammunition was used during the 25 minutes, and 15,200 shells of medium
and large caliber were used on each kilometer of that front. Penal battalions marched through
the breakthrough and did not meet any opposition. eir actions confirmed that additional
softening-up was not necessary, nobody would offer any opposition. is saved thirty min-
utes of time (very significant in war) and thirty thousand tons of ammunition.
Even more artillery was used in the Berlin operation—over 42,000 guns and mortars.
Along the breakthrough areas, huge quantities of ammunition were concentrated, as well as
huge quantities of weapons. Marshal Ivan Konev broke through thirty-six kilometers of front
line, and used 8,626 weapons to do it. Marshal Zhukov concentrated fewer arms—7,318
guns and mortars—but broke through thirty kilometers of front line, so he actually had
higher concentrations of artillery. e main forces of the tank and air force armies were also
gathered in these areas, as well as corresponding amounts of infantry.
e record was set in the area occupied by the 381st Rifle Division of the 2nd Shock
Army, during the course of the East Prussian operation: 468 guns and mortars on one kilo-
meter of front line, not counting the Katyusha salvo-fire installations. During the course of
the war the Red Army used 427 million shells and artillery mines and 17 billion cartridges.
Just divide this by the number of German soldiers and determine how many shells that makes
per soldier. To this you can add the number of hand grenades, land mines, and air bombs.
Who could resist such a mighty army?
Here we must also remember that in the war the Soviet Union used only 15 percent
of the prewar potential of the Ammunition Narkomat; all the rest was lost during the early
periods of the war. Hitler’s surprise attack not only annihilated tens of divisions of the Red
Army and destroyed the strategic reserves; he also occupied the territories where the newest
ammunition factories were located. e Red Army destroyed its own factories or simply
abandoned them as it retreated. Some machines were evacuated, but try to move at least one
furnace for thousands of kilometers. . . . Try to transport even one thousand tons of ammuni-
tion from the border forests to the railroad stations, load them into trains, and evacuate them
under enemy fire.