Page 178 - The Chief Culprit

e Winter War: Finland y 139

the main thrust and direction of his movements. Losing the element of surprise, the aggres-
sor himself becomes its victim—the depth of the security pale is unknown to him, so the
encounter with the main forces of the defenders occurs at a moment previously unknown to
the aggressor, but well planned by the defense.
On the Karelian Isthmus and on other sections of the security pale, Finnish snipers and
light mobile squads were fully active and operating to the best of their capacity. Here is a stan-
dard situation: a column of Soviet tanks, motorized infantry, and artillery is moving along a
forest road. To their left and to their right there is nowhere to go—impassable woods, packed
with land mines. Ahead of them is a bridge. e Soviet demolition experts check for mines
and come back reporting that the way is clear. e first tanks begin to crawl onto the bridge—
and together with the bridge they fly up into the air: packs of dynamite had been inserted
into the supporting beams of the bridge during its construction; they are undetectable, and
even if they had been discovered, any attempt to diffuse them would have triggered an explo-
sion. us, the Soviet column, many kilometers in length, like a giant snake, is stopped in its
path. Now, the Finnish snipers spring into action. ey take their time. Bang, bang, bang,
and once again the forest is silent. And again, bang, bang. e snipers strike from somewhere
far away. ey hit only Red Army officers and tow-truck drivers. A diversion through the for-
est is not an option—keep in mind that on both sides of the road lie impenetrable minefields.
Any attempt by the Soviet demolition experts to approach the destroyed bridge or to defuse
the mines is met by a prompt and accurate response by the Finnish snipers.
e 44th Rifle Division of the Soviet Red Army, which had been advancing four hun-
dred kilometers north of the Karelian Isthmus, was locked in place on three parallel roads
which led to three blown-up bridges. In one day of fighting, the division lost practically its
entire commanding staff. e same was true in other divisions—the columns became im-
mobile, and could not take a step back or a step forward. At night, the columns suffered brief
surprise attacks from somewhere far away in the woods. At night, the Finns fired out a couple
of rounds of shells at a time from their concealed positions in the bushes, hitting the defense-
less ranks. en again all became quiet, until the next round.
It is said that the Red Army did not show its best side in Finland. is is true. But
let us imagine in place of the Soviets a division from any other army. What can they do in
such a situation? Pull back their columns? Heavy artillery and tractors with huge howitzers
in tow cannot pull back. Finnish snipers hit tractor drivers, one by one. With tremendous
difficulty, inch by inch, the column manages to crawl backwards; meanwhile, behind them
another bridge explodes. e column is locked in. All the paths that lead to that other bridge
are also blocked by mines, and the snipers there are also taking their time and hitting, one
by one, commanders, sappers who try to disarm land mines, and drivers. Far ahead is the
practically impenetrable line of concrete fortifications—the Mannerheim Line. To break
through this line without artillery and thousands of tons of ammunition is impossible. . .
. Soviet troops reached the Finnish fortifications, but their heavy artillery was far behind,
bogged down between minefields and blown-up bridges, and under fire. In total, during
their retreat on the Karelian Isthmus the subdivisions of the Finnish army destroyed 143
bridges and viaducts.
As a result of these actions, it took the Red Army two weeks to pass through the security
pale. After this, the divisions of the Red Army reached the main line of defense, having al-
ready suffered heavy losses, with a broken morale and without ammunition, fuel, or supplies.