Page 177 - The Chief Culprit

138 y e Chief Culprit

side and exploded on the Soviet side, killing three privates and one junior officer. Finland’s
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government declared that no shell could have come from Finnish territory, because Finland
had no artillery near the border. Finland furthermore declared immediate willingness to
invite experts from neutral countries or to create a joint committee of Finnish and Soviet
experts for further investigation of the incident. But Stalin did not need any investigation.
Since Finland “attacked” the Soviet Union, the Red Army must “strike in retaliation.”
On November 30, 1939, after a brief but intense artillery softening-up, the Red
Army crossed the Finnish border, having as its objective taking Helsinki by December 21,
1939—Stalin’s sixtieth birthday. e main strike was carried out on the Karelian Isthmus;
secondary strikes were carried out along the entire Finnish-Soviet border, from the Baltic
Sea to the Barents Sea. Radio Moscow declared that the Finnish people rose up against
capitalists and the Red Army was heading forward to assist the uprising. Units of the Red
Army occupied the small village of Terioki. Immediately, Kuusinen’s “government” arrived
from Moscow to this village and went to work. All the “ministers” of the new Communist
Finland for some reason spoke Russian. Kuusinen’s son kept the records and protocols, also
in Russian. e “government” established diplomatic ties with the USSR on December 1,
and on December 2 it signed an “agreement on mutual help and friendship between the
Soviet Union and the Finnish Democratic Republic.” e agreement was signed by com-
rades Molotov and Kuusinen and printed in two copies, but in only one language—Russian.
Comrade Kuusinen also signed in Russian, using the Cyrillic alphabet.
However, a victory march on Helsinki did not happen. e Mannerheim Line was not
located on the immediate border, but deeper in the territory behind the “security pale.” is
pale was a strip of land that started at the border and stretched from twenty-five to sixty-five
kilometers deep into Finnish territory. e security pale was a strip of land full of traps, bar-
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ricades, obstacles, and minefields. e entire space was filled with granite boulders and con-
crete blocks, forest blockages, scarps and counterscarps, and anti-tank trenches. In this strip
for many years, on purpose, there had been no industrial or transportation buildup. Finland
did not keep any large military formations or any large amounts of supplies here. All existing
bridges on this strip were wired with explosives and ready to be blown up or burned, along
with everything else in sight, by the Finnish border patrol in the event of retreat.
e security pale is a kind of shield used by the defending side against the aggressor.
When trapped in this line, the aggressor loses speed of movement, and his troops sustain
casualties even before encountering the main forces of the enemy. In this territory the de-
fending side employs only small but very mobile units. e units burst out from under
cover, carry out sudden attacks, and quickly retreat to new positions, which were prepared
beforehand. ese light squads try to pass themselves off as the main forces of their army.
e aggressor is forced to stop, turn his troops, and spend shells on empty spaces, while
these light squads of the enemy have already quickly and covertly retreated and are preparing
ambushes in new positions.
Upon finding himself in the security line, the aggressor loses his most significant ad-
vantage—surprise. While the aggressor carries out an exhausting struggle against the light
defense squads, the main forces of the defending side have time to achieve full readiness and
meet the aggressor in convenient positions. Finland’s army acted exactly in this manner. e
deeper the security pale stretches, the better for the defense. ere can never be too much of
a good thing. While breaking through a deep security pale, the aggressor involuntarily shows