Page 179 - The Chief Culprit

140 y e Chief Culprit

eir maneuvering capability was strictly limited: any step off the main path could become
the last step. e rear had lagged behind and was constantly under threat of repeated attack
by the light squads of Finnish soldiers, who had flawlessly memorized the area and knew
secret safe passages through all the minefields.
Having overcome the security pale, the Red Army found itself halted by the fortifica-
tions of the Mannerheim Line. e line was in fact a brilliantly camouflaged defense structure,
well integrated into the surroundings, and stretching 135 km in width and up to 30 km in
depth. Its right flank met the shore of the Baltic Sea; its left flank bordered Lake Ladoga. All in
all, the Mannerheim Line counted 2,311 concrete, ironclad, and wooden defense structures.
e fighting on the Mannerheim Line was especially tenacious. e Red Army succeeded in
breaking through the Mannerheim Line only on March 12, 1940, in the process sustaining
colossal casualties, in both men and arms: 126,875 soldiers and officers were either killed in
action, or disappeared without a trace, or died from wounds and disease. Additionally, the
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army counted 188,671 wounded, 58,370 ill, and 17,867 frostbitten.
On March 13, 1940, the war between Finland and the Soviet Union was ended. e
war lasted 105 days and became known as the Winter War. e Soviet Union received the
Karelian Isthmus, but Finland kept her independence.
e whole world was shocked by the unbelievable weakness of the Red Army. e giant
Soviet Union could not take care of Finland, whose population was only slightly more than
3.5 million. All around the world, newspapers were filled with caricatures and reports of the
Soviet Union’s utter lack of readiness for any war, no matter how small.
A conviction arose among military men, writers, historians, and politicians that the
Red Army had demonstrated in Finland complete and utter lack of capacity to wage war.
For many decades this idea has been taught in military academies, schools, and universities.
However, the actions of the Red Army during the Winter War do not demonstrate weakness.
ey exhibit tremendous strength. First of all, it is necessary to keep in mind that the Red
Army acted in conditions that no army had previously faced. It was conducting an attack in
an average temperature of 21 to 24 degrees Celsius below zero. Sometimes it was warmer, but
frequently it was colder. On the very first night of the war, the temperature was registered at
minus 39 degrees Celsius. Some nights had been even colder. Action was taking place not
only on the Karelian Isthmus, but also a thousand kilometers to the north, up to the Arctic
Circle and even farther. e cold there was even more severe. Not a single army in the world
had conducted an offensive operation, even a failed one, under a temperature of minus 20
degrees Celsius. In such temperatures, no one had even attempted to conduct massive at-
tacks, because it is impossible. Nevertheless, the Red Army conducted successful offensive
operations in temperatures of minus 30 degrees Celsius and colder. Stalin ordered the army
to act in impossible conditions, and the Red Army did the impossible.
How did the Finns defend themselves in those conditions?
Defense is a whole different story. For twenty years, practically Finland’s entire military
budget went to funding the creation of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus. Beyond the
infinite minefields, the anti-tank trenches and granite obstacles, the concrete tetrahedrons,
and the wire obstacles that stretched in rows of ten, twenty, and thirty, there was a place
marked on the map as “hill 65.5,” protected by forty-seven rows of thick barbwire on metal
stakes, connected to mines. In the last rows of barbwire, instead of stakes railroad tracks had
been driven into the ground. Behind these rows of barricades were concrete casemates. Each