Page 183 - The Chief Culprit

144 y e Chief Culprit

was decided that the 203-mm howitzer did not have enough power to destroy such construc-
12
tions as the pillboxes. To solve this kind of problem a 305-mm howitzer was needed. For the
record: the 1939 model of the Soviet 305-mm howitzer B-18 weighed 45.7 tons, and a shell
for it weighed 330 kg. e initial speed of the shell was 530 m/s. e maximum distance the
shells could be fired was 16.6 km. Only such “monster-weapons” were suited for the destruc-
tion of the Finnish defenses.
e military experts of the West should have recognized the amazing warfare capa-
bilities of the Red Army and the fallacy of their assumptions. From the actions in Finland,
there could be only one logical conclusion: nothing is impossible for the Red Army. If it
was capable of advancing in such conditions, then it was capable of advancing in any other
conditions—there could be no worse conditions than those in Finland in the winter. If the
Red Army had broken through the Mannerheim Line, then it was ready to crush Europe and
whoever got in the way. In Finland the Red Army proved that it could accomplish any task,
even an “impossible” one. e victorious Red Army accomplished what the strategists of the
West had deemed unfeasible. But the strategists did not accept the fallacy of their predictions.
Instead they declared the Red Army to be unfit and unprepared for war.
However, all who had followed the developments of the Winter War did not pay atten-
tion to certain inconsistencies. e first strange thing happened on March 12, 1940, after the
Red Army broke through the Mannerheim Line. After this, a completely defenseless Finland
spread out before it. Finland could now be taken by bare hands, like a turtle whose shell has
been ruptured. But the Red Army, having broken through the impenetrable defense system
of the Finns, stopped its advance. Why? In December 1939, already having premonitions of
the strength of the Mannerheim Line, the Red Army should have stopped its advance and
not gone to storm it. But if the Red Army did storm the line and, at the cost of unimaginable
casualties, managed to break through it, it should have used what it gained. Stalin broke into
the safe, but then did not take anything from it. Where was Stalin’s logic?
e second inconsistency: all leading military experts before the Winter War declared
that breaking through the Mannerheim Line could not be done by any army. e Red Army
did the impossible. Furthermore, it broke through the line impromptu, for it had not pre-
pared for such limiting conditions. e Red Army broke through the line in only three
months, when all the military experts of the West had maintained that it could not be done in
any time frame. And now, all of a sudden these same experts began talking of the Red Army
being completely unfit for war.
e third inconsistency: the first and loudest reports of the Red Army’s poor per-
formance in Finland came in newspapers funded by Stalin. Stalin’s court poet, Alexander
Tvardovsky, suddenly began speaking of the “infamous war.” For some reason he was not
executed. For some reason, he was awarded Stalin’s praises. Stalin was wise enough to end his
“liberation crusade” after the Mannerheim Line was broken and Finland was deprived of her
security barrier.
Military operations in Finland were ended on March 13, 1940, and only three months
later the three Baltic states, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, surrendered to Stalin without a
fight and became republics of the Soviet Union. e governments and military leadership of
these countries had carefully watched the war in Finland and drew from their observations
a frightening, but correct conclusion: the Red Army was capable of carrying out impossible
orders, and it would not be stopped by any number of casualties. If Stalin commanded the