Page 185 - The Chief Culprit

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Germany’s Strategic Resources

and Stalin’s Plans

e Fuehrer noted that the objective of gaining control of the Finnish Gulf is paramount,
because free navigation in the Baltic Sea and direct delivery of ore from Lulea becomes
possible immediately after the liquidation of the Russian fleet. Taking over Russian ports
from the mainland will require three to four weeks. Only then can the enemy’s subma-
rines be paralyzed. Four weeks of fighting means 2 million tons of iron ore.
—C G F. H, WAR DIARY

ar is gluttonous, that is why every strategist constructs maps of supply routes
that enable key raw materials to reach his country and the country of his oppo-
Wnent. His goals are to defend his supply lines and cut those of the opponent. If
one draws a map of supply sources and supply routes, it becomes clear that Germany’s posi-
tion in 1939 was particularly difficult. After 1939 the position did not improve; it actually
worsened. On the grand scale, Germany has no raw materials. Germany is tied by thousands
of fragile strings to the rest of the world. Taking over Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark,
Norway, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, France, Yugoslavia, and Greece, and conducting
the Anschluss of Austria and Germany did not solve Germany’s supply problem. Gaining
control over millions of people and huge territories that did not contain raw materials only
led Germany to spread herself thin, and did not bring any advantages.
Here is another aspect of the problem: Germany, France, Belgium—all have powerful
steel-casting industries, but they do not have much iron ore. Too many things on the front
and in the rear, from the soles of soldiers’ boots to battleships, are made of steel. Due to steel
shortages, German leaders—as high-ranking as Goering—seriously considered the possibility
of building locomotives of concrete instead of steel. Due to steel shortages, damaged bridges
1
were repaired using wooden logs instead of steel beams. Due to steel shortages, railroad rails
from spare tracks were used to repair the damaged sectors of primary tracks. Railroad tracks
with two-way traffic were transformed into one-track roads. is slowed the entire rhythm of
production in Germany and in the countries Germany occupied.

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