Page 186 - The Chief Culprit

Germany’s Strategic Resources and Stalin’s Plans y 147

In any case, Hitler could not have counted on a quick victory—he had too many en-
emies. A long war was a path to suicide for Hitler, in the most literal sense of the word. In
order to maintain for just a few years what he wanted to establish, he needed to gain iron
ore supply. e richest ore mines in Europe, with high iron readings of up to 60 to 65 per-
cent, were located in the area of Kiruna-Ellivare in the very north of Sweden, and arrived at
German ports through the Baltic Sea.
2
One of the weakest links of the German economy was the loading of iron ore in the
Swedish port of Lulea, followed by the long trip along Finland’s coast through the Gulf of
Bothnia, past the Åland Islands, past the islands Gotland, Oland, Bornholm, and then the
unloading in the German ports. e iron ore was loaded almost at the Arctic Circle and was
transported across the entire Baltic Sea from the northernmost to the southernmost ports.
Neither the British, nor the French, nor any other fleets posed any threat to the transport of
iron ore across the Baltic. For a foreign fleet, breaking into the Baltic Sea was like breaking
into a mousetrap and staying trapped there. But the Soviet Navy did not need to break into
anything. It was already there, in its bases, peacefully awaiting the right opportunity.
For defending the Soviet Union a fleet in the Baltic Sea is not needed at all. Prior to
1940, the Soviet Union held a very small piece of seashore there. For more than two hundred
years St. Petersburg (known as Leningrad in the Soviet era) was the capital of the empire,
and for that reason along this stretch of shoreline all the Russian tsars, beginning with Peter
the Great, had erected fortifications. e entire shoreline was transformed into a chain of sea
fortresses, fortified regions, and coastal artillery batteries.
A coastal battery is something more impressive than a field artillery battery. A coastal
battery can be compared to the artillery turret of battleships and cruisers. Under these turrets
there are labyrinths of concrete casemates. A battleship turret weighs several hundred tons,
sometimes even several thousand. Unlike the one on the ship, the same gun turret mounted
on land can be defended by armored plates of any weight. Under the turret it is possible to
erect casemates from fortified concrete with walls of any thickness. And it must be said that
the Russian tsars put down enough concrete and steel in St. Petersburg’s surroundings, and
the Bolsheviks added even more.
e coastline defenses of the Soviet Union’s Baltic fleet on June 21, 1941, had 124
coastal batteries armed with 253 weapons from 100 to 406 mm in caliber and 60 weapons
that were 45 and 76 mm in caliber. 3
e statistics of the coastline defense weapons are impressive. For example, a 305-mm
cannon could launch shells weighing 470 kg to a distance of 43.9 km. One of the turrets
had the capacity to fire six rounds a minute, almost three tons of metal. A 406-mm weapon
launched a shell weighing 1,108 kg to a distance of 45.5 km. is weapon was capable of
firing the next round only twenty-four seconds after the preceding one. 4
Aside from coastline batteries and forts, the Leningrad region had a rather impressive
concentration of naval cannons on railroad platforms. ese long-range weapons were parked
in concrete hideaways. ere is a web of railroads around Leningrad, so the long-range weap-
ons on railroad platforms could be maneuvered quickly and fired from prearranged and well-
concealed firing positions, and then quickly moved away. e most important weapon of
railroad artillery was the 180-mm cannon with shells of 97.5 kg. It could fire five rounds a
minute, and its range was 37.8 km. ere were also even more powerful cannons: the 203-,
254-, and 356-mm. e 356-mm cannons on railroad transports shot shells weighing 747.8
kg and had a firing range of 44.6 km.