Page 189 - The Chief Culprit

150 y e Chief Culprit

Northwestern front are set: destruction of Finland’s armed forces, gaining control of
her territories within the boundaries, and gaining access to the Gulf of Bothnia by the
forty-fifth day of the operation. . . . On the right, the Northern front (its staff in
Kandalaksha) on the fortieth day of mobilization moves to assault, and on the thirtieth
day of the operation gains control of the regions of Kemi and Oulu. . . . e Red-Flag
Baltic fleet, subordinate in all operations to the Military Council of the Northwestern
front, is issued the following tasks: Working jointly with the air force, destroy the active
navy of Finland and Sweden (in case of involvement by the latter). Assist the ground
forces, acting on the Finland Gulf shore and from the Hanko peninsula, by supplying
their flanks and destroying the coastal defenses of the Finns. Provide the transfer of two
rifle divisions during the first few days of the war from the northern shore of the Estonian
SSR to the Hanko peninsula, as well as transporting and launching an amphibious assault
on the Åland Islands. rough cruiser operations of submarines and air forces, interrupt
Finnish-Swedish naval communications (in the event of the latter’s interference against
the USSR) in the Gulf of Bothnia and the Baltic Sea.

is plan of action was given the name “S.3-20.” e plan was to be put into action at the
moment of receipt of a coded telegram with the signature of the chie of the general staff and
the following contents: “Commence execution of plan ‘S.3-20’.” 12
In this plan there was no mention of the fact that the Soviet Union would fight for the
“guarantee of safety to the city of Lenin,” that is, Leningrad. And there were no hints that
military actions must be initiated only in response to enemy aggression. e usual words “if
the enemy wages war upon us . . .” were absent. Here, it was much simpler: at any moment,
the Leningrad staff would receive a telegram from Moscow, and Soviet armies would advance
to the Gulf of Bothnia, to the Swedish border, to the Åland Islands! e trusted comrades
at the right moment would set up a new “provocation of the Finnish war machine on our
frontier,” and those whose job it was to do so would explain to the workers of the world the
meaning of the “peace-loving global politics of the USSR” and the necessity of our “counter-
blows to the Finnish aggressors.”
e plan “S.3-20” could have been a stand-alone one, but it could also have been
part of a much broader scheme. e plan “S.3-20” allowed the armies of the Leningrad and
Arkhangelsk districts, together with the Baltic fleet, to deliver blows to Finland before the
Red Army hit Germany, simultaneously, or slightly later. But in any case, the blow to Finland
was also a blow to Germany. In the event of putting plan “S.3-20” into action, Soviet troops
were to seize the nickel mines in Petsamo and the Åland Islands, and make their way to the
city of Kemi. It was not a coincidence that in 1940, on the Baltic Sea, the first marine infantry
brigade was formed under the leadership of the Soviet saboteur Colonel Parafilo. It remained
only to send to the Leningrad headquarters the coded message: “Bring plan into execution.”
ere is no need to search for a plan for war against Germany. If plan “S.3-20” had been real-
ized, it meant a deadly blow not only to Finland, but to Germany as well.
In the summer of 1940, Stalin committed another error: he brought Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania into the Soviet Union, organized on their territory the Baltic special military
district, and concentrated all the forces of that region on the border of Eastern Prussia. is
was completely unnecessary, and even harmful, for defense. Some say that Stalin moved his
border to the West and thus strengthened the safety of the USSR. But in fact the situation