Page 194 - The Chief Culprit

e Carving Up of Romania, and its Consequences y 155

hours—one night! Moreover, Stalin did not just have simple tanks, but fast-moving ones,
made especially for such advances. e area ahead of them was even and flat, the ground was
hard, and the roads were in good condition. e BT tanks could easily reach a speed of 40 to
50 km/h here, and without their tracks that would rise to 70 to 80 km/h. at would have
come to only three hours of plain driving time. And it was not at all necessary for all the tanks
to reach the oil wells. If only ten tanks had reached them that would have sufficed. Oil fields
can be ignited with incendiary shells, or even with a simple soldier’s lighter. Without oil, one
cannot fight. Oil is not only fuel; it is also a raw resource for the chemical industry, without
which one cannot get by. If only one Soviet tank company of ten tanks had wound up in the
Ploieşti vicinity, and if each driver had had a box of matches, the war in Europe would have
ended with the early defeat of the ird Reich.
A seizure of Ploieşti by Soviet troops, or just a fire in the oil production areas, would
have meant paralysis for Germany. In the event of Ploieşti falling to the Soviets, all German
tanks, automobiles, cruisers, battleships, submarines, and airplanes would have been stopped
in their tracks. Who cares that you have talented generals, officers, soldiers, pilots, and artil-
lerists? Without fuel all their talents would be completely useless. A freeze on oil supply to
the German war machine opened up the way for thousands of other Soviet tanks. From Brest
and Lvov, from Belostok and Grodno, the road to Berlin was now very short. If the German
army and aviation were paralyzed, and no one offered resistance, then on good roads the tank
units could reach not only Berlin and Munich, but Paris and Marseille as well.
In May and June of 1940 Hitler was crushing the armies of Britain, Belgium, Holland,
and France. German tank units headed for the Atlantic Ocean, making a huge detour around
Paris. Practically the entire Germany army fought in the West. Hitler victoriously crushed
France and British troops on the continent. Against France and Britain, Hitler threw his
entire naval fleet, air force, all his tanks, and all his heavy artillery. e best German generals
fought there. And in the rear, on the borders of the Soviet Union, Hitler left only ten weak
infantry divisions. Here, there was not a single tank, a single airplane, a single heavy artillery
weapon. Most importantly, the ten infantry divisions were all in Poland and Slovakia. In
Romania, there were no German troops.
In June 1940 neither Hitler nor his generals had any intentions or plans to attack the
Soviet Union. e Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH—German Army High Command) and
the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW—Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) had
neither rough drafts nor preliminary designs for a war against the USSR. ey had no orders
from Hitler in this regard. Not a word was said about war against the USSR.
After the defeat of France, Hitler ordered a drastic reduction in German armed forces.
is reduction was widespread and intense, for there were no plans, hints, or foresight indi-
cating that a war against the Soviet Union might be approaching. And all at once came the
Soviet strike against Romania. Oil is the blood of war. Without oil, fighting becomes impos-
sible. Stalin’s axe was raised over the oil production in Romania.
In Berlin, it was finally recognized that the Soviet threat to Germany was lethal. Soviet
tanks advanced to Romania, causing chaos in German headquarters: if the tanks did not
stop, if they advanced another 180 km, then Germany would capitulate within the next few
months. Romanian troops made no resistance and put up no obstacles to the Soviet advance.
ere were no German troops in Romania. It was impossible to quickly transfer troops from
France. Even if it had been possible, a large number of German troops in Romania could