Page 195 - The Chief Culprit

156 y e Chief Culprit

not have received adequate supplies. Even if it had been possible to provide supplies, then
Germany would have been forced to have fewer troops in Poland, meaning an even more
direct road to Berlin would have been laid open to Stalin’s tanks.
Soviet troops occupied Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina and stopped. Berlin breathed
a sigh of relief. However, what would have happened if, the next day, Stalin had ordered the
advance to continue? A solution was found: in case of an emergency, it would be necessary to
deliver a warning blow to the Soviet Union, using ten divisions in another location, thereby
creating for the Red Army a diversion from Romania. After conducting the battles on maps,
the German high command understood that ten divisions would be insufficient. ey de-
cided to use twenty, and saw the same result. ey increased the number of divisions, again
and again. In the end, it was decided: in order to not allow Stalin to seize or destroy the oil
industry in Romania, it was necessary to deliver a blow to the Soviet Union with the might
of the entire German armed forces.
On July 21, 1940, Hitler for the first time in a very tight circle uttered the idea of
the “Russian problem.” On July 21 the head of ground forces, General Field Marshal W.
Brauchitsch, received an order from Hitler to begin developing a specific plan for war in the
East. e next day, Brauchitsch entrusted Halder, the head of general staff for ground forces,
with fully evaluating all the different potentialities “in a military operation against Russia.”
Major General Erich Marcks was then appointed to Halder’s staff as an aide for developing
the specifics of the eastern campaign. On July 29 Marcks began planning a military campaign
against Russia. 1
For the Soviet Union, the consequences of a bloodless victory in Romania were cata-
strophic. First of all, neutral Romania was faced with a terrible choice: whose side should
it take? Europe was being torn into pieces by two monsters, Hitler and Stalin. Stalin had
suddenly demanded Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, and Romania was forced to give
them up. What would Stalin demand tomorrow? Hitler, on the other hand, did not demand
anything. e choice was simple, and Romania got Hitler’s protection. e result: the Soviet
Union obtained another hostile country along its border; the front, that was supposed to
protect the USSR in case of war, stretched for almost another eight hundred kilometers; and
Hitler received an ally that held oil. Without oil, Germany could not fight. In other words,
having Romania in his arms, Hitler could attack the Soviet Union. Without this new alli-
ance the attack would have been impossible. But the most important effect lay in something
else. Stalin frightened Hitler. It was precisely the “liberation” of Bessarabia and Northern
Bukovina that acted as the last warning for Hitler. A direct Soviet threat arose over the oil
fields of Romania, and precisely because of this threat Hitler ordered his commanders to
prepare a strike against the Soviet Union.
In Stalin’s career there were few errors. One of the few, but the most significant one,
was the occupation of Bessarabia in 1940. He could have taken Bessarabia and continued on
to Ploieşti, which would have meant the destruction of Germany. Or, he could have waited
until Hitler landed troops in Britain, and after that he could have taken over all of Romania.
is too would have ended the “thousand-year Reich.” Stalin, however, made one step in the
direction of oil, took over the launching ground for the next attack—and stopped to wait.
rough these actions, he showed interest in Romanian oil and alarmed Hitler, who before
this had concentrated on the West, North, and South, without paying much attention to
“neutral” Stalin in the East.