Page 196 - The Chief Culprit

e Carving Up of Romania, and its Consequences y 157

On July 16, 1940, Hitler signed the directive No.16 concerning preparations for land-
ing troops in Great Britain. e operation was given the code name Zeeloewe (Sea Lion); the
plan was for the operation to be completed by August 15. But the annexation of Bessarabia,
Northern Bukovina, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union forced Hitler to
make a sharp U-turn and look at what was happening behind his back.
Why did Stalin need Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina? Here is the official answer of
the Soviet historians to that question: “From the Bessarabian territory, the Soviet air force
could keep Romanian oil industry, which was the main supplier of oil to Germany, under
constant threat. Northern Bukovina was needed because through its territory went a railroad
of strategic importance, which stretched from Odessa through Kishinev, Chernovtsi, to Lvov,
and which had a European track which enabled it to allow usage by railroad cars from all
over Europe.” 2
Here is what Hitler had said regarding the same matter, but half a century earlier:

It is absolutely obvious that the Soviets were determined to direct the unfolding of events
in the Balkans in the direction necessary to them, and in that manner to transform the area
into launching grounds for an attack on us and the remaining countries of Europe. And,
doing everything possible to achieve this goal, they simultaneously declared readiness to
sign trade agreements with us, which would seem to be favorable to us but would in fact
cut us off from our oil sources as soon as their preparations for the decisive coup were
finished. In the summer of 1941 they intended to deliver a crushing defeat to Romania,
3
for it was the only country, except Russia, that delivered us oil.
Soviet historiography advanced Hitler’s argument. It talks not only of a real Soviet
threat to the only German oil source, but also about a segment of railway for European
cars. In the Soviet Union, the railways use a broad gauge. Central and Western Europe use
a narrow gauge. In September 1939, during the partition of Poland, the Red Army seized
half of Poland’s locomotives and railroad cars. ey were useless in the territory of the Soviet
Union, because the gauge on the “liberated” territories was quickly changed to fit the broad
Soviet standard. But Stalin prepared for the “liberation” of Germany and the rest of Europe.
During the course of the first future operations, before the German gauge was amended to
fit the Soviet standard, Stalin would need many locomotives and trains with a narrow gauge
to supply his troops that were quickly moving westward. e Polish locomotives and trains
clearly did not suffice to supply millions of tons of ammunition, arms, liquid fuel, and spare
parts. at is why Stalin took Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina—to expand the number
of trains for railways with a narrow gauge. In the course of the Bessarabian campaign, Soviet
forces captured 141 locomotives, 1,866 covered train cars, 325 half-covered train cars, 45
platforms, 19 cisterns, 31 passenger cars, and 2 luggage cars. But even that was not enough
4
for Stalin. At the Soviet-Romanian talks in July 1940, regarding the settlement of contested
issues, the Soviet representatives demanded that Romania return all captured mobile railroad
units. On July 31, 1940, the two sides signed an agreement on the transfer of 175 locomo-
tives and 4,375 cars to the USSR by August 25. 5
In a defensive war, trains seized in Poland, Bessarabia, and Northern Bukovina would
not have been needed. us, Stalin needed Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina not for de-
fense, not in order to “bring the people happiness.” Stalin’s plot was much broader and deep-
er: to take Hitler by the throat and to bring “happiness” to all of Europe.