Page 180 - The Chief Culprit

e Winter War: Finland y 141

major defensive construction stored ammunition and fuel, contained warm sleeping quarters,
a restroom, a kitchen, a dining room, and had running water and electricity. Communication
lines, command posts, hospitals—all were below ground, under concrete, in the woods, hid-
den in the snow, all in warmth. e snipers who spent days waiting for their victims, and the
soldiers of the light ski squads which raided the rear of the Red Army, were warmly clad and
well equipped. Finnish soldiers are born, raised, and trained to act in these conditions. ey
know that, after several days of active patrol or ski raids, they will return to their comfortable
bunkers, where a bowl of hot soup waits for them and where they can rest before their next as-
signment. ey know that in the event that they are wounded, an operating table well below
the ground awaits them, along with a clean, dry, and warm hospital bed.
But try attacking under these conditions. Try to amputate a leg when beyond the thin
cloth wall of the hospital tent the temperature is minus 40, and inside it is minus 30.
In addition to the cold, there was the snow. e depth of the snow cover was up to 1.5
meters. Even if the temperature had been warmer, but the snow cover the same, conducting
offensive operations would still have been impossible. Under the snow were the swamps.
Deep snow acts as insulation, so the swamps do not freeze. Furthermore, chemical reactions
take place in the swamps and radiate heat. As a result, even in the most severe cold, people,
cars, and tanks fall under the snow and drown in the marshes. But even this is not all. ere
are not only swamps, but also lakes. Many of them also do not freeze, and for the same rea-
son: where there is no snow, the water freezes to the bottom, but where there is a thick snow
cover, the ice is very thin, and can perhaps support a person, but not a tank. Finland is a land
of a thousand lakes, but how can you tell what is a lake and what is a field? Everything around
was white, fluffy, sparkling. “ e theater of operations consisted of 50 percent woodlands,
25 percent water, some swampland, and only about 10 percent of the total surface could be
crossed by tanks.” 7
On top of everything, under the snow were granite boulders. To the eye, the fields
looked even under the snow. But as soon as the tanks tried to cross them, they ripped their
tracks and broke their rollers. is happened even before they reached the minefields. e
whole environment in Finland is one big anti-tank measure. Tanks cannot do anything here.
Everywhere is either a field full of boulders, or a lake, or an impassible thicket of a forest. And
all this is laced with millions of mines. A mistake can be made, but only once.
During the 105 days of the war, there were twenty-five days of flying weather. e rest
of the time, blizzards or snowfall impeded flight. In December, there are very few daylight
hours. Complete darkness falls at four o’clock. And farther north the day is even shorter, if
there is any daytime at all. Any place where trees can grow, there is impenetrable forest. Tanks
cannot do anything in the woods; artillery fire cannot be aimed in such thicket. ere is no
visible horizon. e observer cannot see where his shells go—he can hear them fly above his
head, but he cannot see where they land. From the battery he hears yells: Too close? Too far?
Who can tell? e only view of where the shells land is from the very field these shells land
on. On the other hand, the Finnish artillery had always fought in these regions. Every battery
had during years of peace drilled in these areas, and the aimers, observers, and commanders
knew by heart the data for precision shelling.
And so, the Soviet artillery was pretty useless, the tanks were useless, for this environ-
ment is not for tanks. e air force also could not help, for it could not see anything. A tactics
manual teaches: “From above, the forest resembles an even surface, and to locate troops in a