Page 212 - The Chief Culprit

Destruction of the Stalin Line y 173

regions are in the depth of the country, the enemy, before beginning the storming, must cover
from 20 or 30 to 100 or 150 km of territory saturated with minefields and other unpleasant
surprises. e aggressor will have to cross many rivers and streams whose bridges have been
destroyed. Before the storming, enemy troops will already have suffered significant casualties
in the hundreds of ambushes along the way.
e security pale before the Stalin Line not only reduced the speed of the enemy and
wore out his strength, but it also served as a fog over the sea, behind which hid a row of ice-
bergs. Not knowing the exact location of the field strongholds of the Stalin Line, the enemy
could unexpectedly find himself right in front of Soviet armed structures and in the midst of
their deadly fire. e location of the Stalin Line deep in Soviet territory, behind the security
pale, produced the opportunity to counter the surprise element of attack with a surprise ele-
ment of defense. e fortified regions were masked and hidden in such a way that in most
cases a clash between the aggressor and Stalin’s army would be unexpected for the aggressor.
Unlike the Maginot Line, the Stalin Line was not continuous. Rather wide passage-
ways were left between the fortified regions. In an emergency, the passages could quickly be
closed with land mines, barricades, or field defense by regular troops. Or the passages could
stay open, offering the aggressor the option to not storm the fortifications head on, but to
squeeze between them instead. If the enemy attempted the latter, most of his advancing
troops would be crushed in several isolated columns. Each column had to advance through a
corridor shelled from all sides, with its flanks, rear, and communication lines under constant
and serious threat.
e thirteen fortified regions on the Stalin Line came at a tremendous cost in effort
and money. In 1938 it was decided to strengthen all thirteen regions by building within them
heavy artillery installations. e construction of eight more regions started. In one year, the
new fortified regions counted 1,028 armed field strongholds.
en, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed. e pact created a common border
between Germany and the USSR. In such a threatening atmosphere, Stalin could have done
any number of things to increase the safety of the western Soviet borders and guarantee the
USSR’s neutrality in the war. Instead, in the fall of 1939, at the beginning of World War II,
he ordered further construction of fortified regions to stop. Garrisons in fortified regions
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on the Stalin Line were the first to be cut back in numbers, and then completely disbanded.
Soviet factories lowered the output of arms and special materials for field stronghold struc-
tures. e existing fortified regions were disarmed; their ammunition, weapons, observation
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instruments, and communication lines were put in storage. Some buildings were given to the
farming associations for use as crop silos. Most were just buried in soil.
In addition to lowering the production of arms for fortified regions, Soviet industry,
after the start of World War II, stopped producing other defense weapons. For example, the
production of anti-tank cannon stopped completely, as well as the 76-mm division cannon,
which could be used against tanks. Anti-tank rifles were taken out of production and out of
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the supply of the Red Army. ey were taken away from all formations and put in storage.
Everything connected with defense was mercilessly dismantled and destroyed. At the same
time, the Red Army was fighting in Finland, where Stalin and his marshals saw that fortified
regions and security pales had tremendous value for defense.
To be fair, during the summer of 1940, the construction of a line of fortified regions
began right on the new Soviet-German border. However, the new line was never finished. In