Page 214 - The Chief Culprit

Destruction of the Stalin Line y 175

newly built constructions and those destroyed earlier were even more astonishing.
e Molotov Line drastically differed from the Stalin Line in design and in detail. ere
were four main differences between the field strongholds torn down near the old borders and
those created near the new ones: the Molotov Line was built so that the enemy could see it;
it was built on secondary locations; it was not covered by a security pale, minefields, or other
engineered obstacles; and the builders did not use many opportunities available to them to
fortify the line, and did not rush to complete their work.
For example, such a secondary location was in the Brest area. ere the border river was
crossed at once by six railroad and automotive bridges. e main strategic direction of attack
of the Germans was Warsaw-Brest-Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow. at’s why the bridges of Brest
had huge strategic value. But the new fortified region was built 27 km north of Brest where
there were no bridges! e fortified regions of the Molotov Line were pushed to the very edge
of the border. ey were not covered by a security pale, and in case of sudden attack, the gar-
risons had no time to take firing positions and prepare their arms. 15
Unlike the Stalin Line, the fortified regions of the Molotov Line had very little depth.
All that could be built on the very edge of the border was built there. According to Lieutenant
General V. F. Zotov, rear defenses were neither built nor planned. New fortifications weren’t
16
built on locations tactically valuable for defense, but along the state border, following its
twists and bends. New military buildings were not defended by barbwire fences, mines,
trenches, or tetrahedrons. ere were no engineered obstacles in the construction area. e
new constructions were not camouflaged. 17
At the same time, the German generals were doing the same. Between 1932 and 1937,
mighty field strongholds were built on the shores of the Oder River, shielding Germany from
strikes from the east. ese were first-rate military structures, blended with the landscape and
brilliantly camouflaged. I will not describe them in detail, but they are a formidable example
of the German preciseness, accuracy, and industriousness. Fortified regions in the area be-
tween the Oder and the Warta rivers could serve as examples of the highest achievement of
military engineering of the early twentieth century.
As soon as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed in Moscow and the German army
invaded Poland, the magnificent field strongholds near the old German border were aban-
doned and never again occupied by armies. Many field constructions were used for other
purposes. For example, in the Hochwald region there was a powerful fortification ensemble,
which included twenty-three four-story military constructions, connected by 30 km of un-
derground tunnels. It was transformed into a factory for airplane motors. Having advanced
and met with the Red Army in mid-Poland, the German troops began constructing a new line
of fortified regions. ey were built on secondary locations and pushed right up to the Soviet
borders. In front of the new fortified regions, there were no minefields and no obstacles. e
Germans worked night and day, and the Soviet border patrol saw that very clearly. 18
German construction continued until May 1941, after which, to use Soviet language,
“construction was rated as a second-class priority.” Out of eighty military constructions
planned to be built on the border river San, only seventeen were completed. ey were all
insufficiently camouflaged. Each of these constructions could be described as light compared
to those on the old German-Polish border: relatively thin walls, and steel armor plates of just
100 mm. On the old borders, along the Oder line, they had used much stronger armor plates
of up to 350 mm. Soviet officers later saw both German and Soviet LFPs on both sides of the