Page 231 - The Chief Culprit

192 y e Chief Culprit

not defense. Having learned that the war had begun, the Soviet commanders finished their
last preparations for landing operations. e actions of the Soviet flotilla commanders, as well
as those of the 14th Rifle Corps, divisions of which were concentrated in the Danube delta
region, and of the 79th Border Unit of the NKVD, were planned beforehand and meticu-
lously worked out.
On June 25, 1941, the warships of the Danube flotilla, under cover of fire from the
shoreline batteries, landed reconnaissance and sabotage units of the NKVD on the Romanian
shores, followed by regiments from the 51st Rifle Division of the 14th Rifle Corps. Soviet
soldiers acted decisively, boldly, and quickly. e complicated operation, which involved river
ships and aviation, as well as field, shoreline, and ship artillery, units of the Red Army and
the NKVD, was worked out with immaculate precision. On the morning of June 26, 1941,
a red flag went up above the central church of the Romanian city of Kilia. A key springboard
area of seventy kilometers of Romanian territory had fallen into Soviet hands. e Danube
flotilla was preparing for further invasion operations up the Danube. To aid the flotilla, the
3rd Paratroops Corps stationed in the Odessa district could be sent out. But all this had to be
cancelled, because on other areas of the front the Red Army was retreating; an order to retreat
was issued to the Danube flotilla as well. With the Black Sea behind it, the Danube military
flotilla found itself cut off from Soviet troops without the possibility of retreat. Most of its
ships had to be sunk, while gigantic supplies, stored toward the movement of the flotilla up
the river, had to be burned, or simply left behind.
Hitler and Stalin both understood perfectly well what the expression “oil is the blood of
war” meant. Colonel General A. Jodl testified that, in an argument with Guderian, Hitler de-
clared: “You want to invade without oil—well, we shall see what comes out of this.” As early
as 1927, Stalin took seriously the problems of the impending World War II. On December 3,
1927, he said: “It is impossible to fight without oil, and he who has the advantage in terms of
oil has the chance of victory in the impending war.” In June 1940, when nobody was threat-
3
ening the Soviet Union, tens of Soviet river military ships appeared in the Danube delta. at
step had no defensive value, but was a threat to the unprotected Romanian oil routes and
consequently a deadly threat to Germany.
In July 1940, Hitler conducted intensive consultations with his generals and concluded
that it was not at all easy to defend Romania: the supply routes extended all over and passed
through the mountains. If a huge number of German troops were transferred to defend
Romania, western Poland and eastern Germany, including Berlin, would be exposed to a
Soviet attack. If a lot of troops were concentrated in Romania and tried to keep it at any cost,
it would not help: the territory perhaps would be retained, but oil fields would still burn up
from bombings and artillery fire.
In July 1940, Hitler for the first time said that the Soviet Union could be dangerous,
especially if German troops left the continent for the British Isles and Africa. On November
13, 1940, in a conversation with Molotov, Hitler indicated the necessity to retain a huge
number of German troops in Romania, obviously hinting that the Soviet military posed a
threat to Romanian oil. Molotov ignored the hint. After Molotov’s departure in December,
4
Hitler issued a directive for the preparation of Operation Barbarossa.
In June 1940, when the German army was fighting in France, Zhukov, on Stalin’s or-
ders and without consulting the German allies, brought river warships to the Danube delta.
Hitler asked the head of the Soviet government to divert the Soviet threat from the oil heart
of Germany. Stalin and Molotov refused.