Page 233 - The Chief Culprit

194 y e Chief Culprit

Admiral V. Grigoryev, who in 1943 received the new flotilla in the Kiev region, remem-
bered the words of Zhukov: “‘Along the Pripyat’, you will be able to reach [the] Bug, Narev,
and Vistula toward Warsaw, and then transfer to the German rivers. Who knows, perhaps all
the way to Berlin!’ He made a sharp turn, gave me an intense look, and repeated, stressing
each word: ‘All the way to Berlin! Ah?’”
9
In 1945, Admiral Grigoryev reached Berlin with his flotilla.
e Red Army had no marines. For land battles, it was easier and cheaper to use regular
infantry, and landing on faraway shores was not yet in the plans. But suddenly Hitler made
a thrust to the west, baring his back to Stalin. is careless step by Hitler brought on the
most radical structural changes within the Red Army: the remains of defense were obliter-
ated, while the offense was strengthened. e Soviet Marines were born in June 1940, when
Hitler crushed France. At that time, there were two ocean fleets and two sea fleets in the
Soviet armed forces, as well as two river flotillas: the Amur and the Dnepr. e ocean fleet
did not receive any marines. e Pacific and Arctic oceans did not interest Stalin at the time.
e Amur flotilla safeguarded the far eastern Soviet borders and also did not receive any ma-
rines. e Dnepr flotilla was divided into two attacking flotillas, and the Pinsk one, located
in the Belarussian forests, received a company of marines. How interesting: marines not on
the oceans, but in the Belarussian swamps. We can infer from these facts where Stalin was
preparing for defense and where he was preparing for invasion.
A brigade of marines numbering several thousand men was formed as part of the Baltic
fleet, whose only possible enemy could be Germany and its allies. On June 23, 1941, Soviet
marines received their “battle baptism” during the defense of the naval base at Liepaja. e
base was less than one hundred kilometers away from the German borders, but had no land
obstacles and was not at all prepared for defense. According to testimony from Soviet admi-
rals and German trophy documents, the bay of Liepaja was packed with Soviet submarines
“like a can of sardines.” e official history of the Soviet navy, published by the Academy of
Sciences of the USSR, openly acknowledged that Liepaja was being prepared as a frontline
10
base of the Soviet fleet for aggressive warfare on the seas. e marines in Liepaja were situ-
ated so close to the German borders that in the first twenty-four hours of the war they had
already participated in defensive battles, although, of course, they had been created for a
totally different purpose. In a defensive battle, regular infantry was far superior to marines.
e Danube military flotilla had two land-army companies, which officially were not
listed as marines. But even before the German invasion, at least two Soviet rifle divisions—
the 25th Chapaev and the 51st Perekop from the 14th Rifle Corps—prepared themselves
in the Danube region for action as marines, and in the first days of the war they landed on
Romanian shores.
e Black Sea fleet had even more powerful forces. Officially it had no marines, but in
early June 1941, the 9th Special Rifle Corps under the command of Lieutenant General P. I.
Batov was transferred from the Trans-Caucasus to the Crimea. e corps was very unusual
in its personnel, arms, and training. On June 18 and 19, 1941, the Black Sea fleet conducted
grandiose training exercises of an aggressive nature, during which one of the divisions of
the 9th Special Rifle Corps was loaded on warships and performed a landing on “enemy”
shores. A landing of an entire division from warships had never before been practiced in the
Red Army.