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Mountain Divisions on the Steppes of Ukraine y 199

sent through the passes along all more or less passable routes to make sure they could be sur-
mounted in practical conditions by tanks, motor vehicles, tractors, animal-drawn transport,
and pack-carrying beasts.” 8
During the same year, German generals were secretly carrying out identical experi-
ments on their western borders in the mountains. eir goal was to prepare a sudden attack
against France and its allies. e German generals had to make sure that troops, tanks, artil-
lery tractors, and transport could pass through the Ardennes. e German mountain experi-
ments were successful. e attack on France was unanticipated both in time and place, and
it was deadly.
e Soviet commanders were preparing to do the same against Germany. Marshal of
the Soviet Union Bagramian, then a colonel responsible for planning the military operations
of the 12th Army, said: “When I was studying the operational plans, I was struck by the
following fact—our frontier army had neither a deployment nor a border-protection plan.”
e colonel’s words demonstrate that the safe of the operations branch of the 12th Army
contained plans. ey were complex documents that had to be studied. Yet among those war
plans there were none for defense.
Bagramian also described training exercises of the 12th Army attended by General
Zhukov. Only offensive tactics were worked on, and on the maps the war took place on
German territory. e game began with Soviet troops crossing the border river San. e
military game was against a real enemy and it involved top secret intelligence information.
Differences arose between Zhukov and the army commander. Commander of the 12th Army
General Parusinov insisted: “We must do our best to inflict maximum casualties on the ene-
my with our first strike.” Zhukov understood that these were good intentions, but he wanted
a strike on a wide rather than a very narrow front. at was what the argument was about.
Shortly after the argument, Parusinov was replaced by General P. G. Ponedelin, Zhukov’s old
friend. en, the experiments in how to master the mountain passes continued.
Zhukov wasn’t interested in the mountain passes because of defense. If he had wanted
to make the passes impassable to the enemy, he would have sent his troops to the mountains,
dug up all mountain paths and roads, and built reinforced concrete fortifications near the
passes, instead of right alongside the border river. It would have been more economical; the
enemy could not have observed the construction work and would have been unable to cross
the passes. But would anyone really attack the Soviet Union across mountain ranges when
there were plenty of open spaces?
e mountains were exceptionally important to the Soviet command. Germany was
separated from her main source of oil by a double barrier of mountains, in Czechoslovakia
and Romania. A Soviet strike across the passes in Czechoslovakia or Romania would effec-
tively cut the oil artery. Marshal Zhukov wrote: “Germany’s weak spot was oil supply, but it
made up for this to some extent by importing oil from Romania.” e experiments in the
9
mountains continued. e capabilities of each kind of troops and every type of combat and
transport vehicle, operating in the conditions which prevailed in the Carpathian passes, were
carefully studied. Standards were established and carefully checked, and guidance was com-
piled for the troops. e time taken by various types of vehicle to negotiate these mountain
passes was carefully recorded and analyzed. e collected information, of course, was crucial
for the planning of offensive operations, especially lightning operations. Bagramian was re-
cording time frames to plan on the basis of very specific data.