Page 237 - The Chief Culprit

198 y e Chief Culprit

Army could be used only in Romania. ere were plenty of mountains there. It is not at all
coincidental that this division (commanded by Major General S. G. Galaktionov) was part
of the 48th Rifle Corps of Major General Malinovsky, the most aggressive corps commander
on the entire southern front. e 48th Rifle Corps was in the flank of the 9th Army which
was closest to the front. If the 9th “Shock” Army moved to Romania, then most of the army
would be fighting on flat land, while its right flank would scratch at the mountain chain. For
5
this situation, it was most reasonable to have one mountain-rifle division, and precisely on
the rightmost flank, which was exactly what was done.
Let’s examine another army, which was a carbon copy of the 9th Army. Formally, it was
called just the 12th Army. It had one mechanized and two rifle corps, and other units. It had
nine divisions, including two tank divisions and one motorized division. It was indistinguish-
able in number, name, and composition from other similar invasion armies. It had been set
up specifically for the “liberation crusade” of the Red Army into Poland. It then had a tank
6
corps, two cavalry corps, and two rifle divisions. It had little artillery and infantry, because
there was no need here to break through a powerful defense. To the contrary, it had mobile
7
troops necessary for a fast advance.
Its subsequent fate was also typical. After the “liberation” campaign in Poland, the army
stayed on the German border. Later, the 12th Army underwent the same transformation as all
adjacent invasion armies. Its main strike mechanism was no longer called a tank corps, but a
mechanized corps, to allay the fears of the leaders of neighboring countries. e deletion of
the word “tank” from the corps’ name was followed by an increase in the number of tanks in
the army. e cavalry was taken away from it. Its capacity for disrupting the enemy’s defenses
was increased. e number of rifle divisions was tripled, and the amount of artillery in each
division was doubled. In addition, one artillery brigade and four separate artillery regiments
were added to the army. e capability to counter the enemy’s engineering defenses also in-
creased when a separate regiment of engineers was brought into the army.
e unusual feature of the 12th Army was its ethnic composition. When Stalin was
preparing to invade Poland in 1939, he filled the 12th Army with Ukrainians, apparently
bearing in mind the long-standing animosity between Poles and Ukrainians. e army was
formed in Ukraine. erefore, the reservists were also drawn from there, and they formed
a solid majority in the 12th Army. Far-reaching changes had already taken place in 1940.
Ethnic Russians were appointed to key posts to mask the army’s unusual ethnic composition.
e greater part of the army, however, was neither Ukrainian nor Russian. It was Caucasian:
there were Georgians, Armenians, and Azeris in other armies, but their presence was par-
ticularly strong in the 12th Army. General Zhukov, who commanded the Military District,
sought out Colonel I. K. Bagramian, an Armenian who was a longtime friend, from his job
as a military academy lecturer, and appointed him Chief of the Operations Branch (War
Planning) of the 12th Army. General Agrat Arushunyan, another Armenian, became the
army’s chief of staff.
Zhukov gathered natives of the Caucasus into the ranks of the 12th Army because it
was secretly but steadily changed into a mountain army. Zhukov personally demanded of its
commanders that their troops should have a thorough knowledge of the Carpathian passes,
not just on paper but from practical experience. In 1940, he ordered that “specially reinforced
groups, made up of various combat vehicles and means of transport, should in the autumn be