Page 242 - The Chief Culprit

Stalin in May y 203

Molotov did it for him. He even received the nickname “Mr. No.” All demands came from
Molotov, all concessions from Stalin. Simply put, Stalin did good with his hands, and evil
with the hands of others. ose who did evil on Stalin’s orders carried the responsibility, while
Stalin remained clean.
However, in May 1941, Stalin took on the official burden of government responsibil-
ity. For Stalin a new title meant not a strengthening of power, but a limiting of it, more
precisely self-limiting. From then on, he not only took the most important decisions, but
also carried official responsibility for them. Until then, Stalin’s power had only been limited
by the outside borders of the Soviet Union, and not always even by them. What forced him
to voluntarily take on the burden of responsibility for his actions?
Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N. G. Kuznetsov testified: “When Stalin took
on the duties of Chairman of the People’s Commissars Council, the system of leadership
practically did not change.” If practically nothing changed, why did Stalin need the new
2
title? “Meanwhile, all of Stalin’s deeds and crimes were focused, logical and calculated.” 3
What was Stalin’s logic? “I don’t know any problems that could relate to the internal sit-
uation in the Soviet Union and be so serious as to elicit such an action from Stalin. I would be
more certain in stating that if Stalin decided to take the highest government position, the rea-
sons for his action should be sought in the [realm of] foreign affairs,” reported Schulenburg,
the German ambassador to Moscow. Soviet marshals said the same thing: Stalin’s appoint-
4
ment was tied to foreign affairs.
Let us examine what foreign policy problems Stalin was expected to solve in May 1941.
Germany crushed many European countries, so there could be no problems with the govern-
ments of those countries. e Soviet Union had friendly relations with France, the large part
of which was occupied by Germany. ere were no problems with Britain: it retained inde-
pendence and stretched a hand of friendship to Stalin, exemplified in a letter from Churchill
to Stalin dated July 1, 1941. Roosevelt was more than amicable toward Stalin: he warned
him of dangers, and American technology flowed into the USSR. ere were only two pos-
sible enemies. Japan had seen a demonstration of Soviet might at Khalkhin-Gol in August
1939, signed an agreement with the Soviet Union, and looked away from Soviet borders.
erefore, only Germany could have forced Stalin to take the step that seemed inexplicable
at first glance.
What could Stalin, using his new official title of head of the government, undertake
regarding Germany? ere were three possibilities: establish an unshakeable peace with Ger-
many; officially lead an armed struggle against German aggression; or officially lead a sudden
attack on Germany.
e first possibility can be ruled out immediately, because Molotov had already signed
a peace pact with Germany. Stalin continued to use Molotov for peace talks. It is known that
even on June 21, 1941, Molotov tried to meet with German leaders, while Stalin made no
such attempts.
e second possibility also doesn’t withstand examination. Stalin could not have as-
sumed leadership in anticipation of a German attack, simply because he did not foresee it.
In the first day of the war, the head of the government should have addressed the people and
told them the terrible news. But Stalin avoided fulfilling his duties, and on June 22 Molotov
spoke to the people. Why would Stalin sit in Molotov’s chair in May, only to hide behind