Page 248 - The Chief Culprit

June 13, 1941 y 209

automobiles. A rifle corps had 50,000 soldiers and officers. Five corps made a quarter of
a million men. e directive further demanded “to keep the transfer of troops completely
secret. March at night and conduct tactical training. Take along with the troops all movable
reserves of ammunition and fuel.” e document was signed by the People’s Commissar for
Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko, and the Chief of General
Staff Army General Zhukov. “We had to prepare all operational documentation that dealt
with moving five rifle and four motorized corps from the positions of permanent location
to the border zone,” wrote Bagramian (at that time a colonel and chief of operational staff
in the Kiev special military district). “ ey took with them everything necessary for action.
7
8
e move was conducted at night to secure secrecy.” Colonel General I. I. Liudovnikov (at
that time a colonel and commander of the 200th Rifle Division in the 31st Corps) was one
of those who executed this order: “We were ordered to begin a campaign . . . in full deploy-
ment . . . concentrated in the forests 10 to 15 km northeast of the border town Kovel. e
9
move was to be made secretly, only at night, on forested terrain.” Marshal of the Soviet
Union K. S. Moskalenko (at that time a major general of artillery and commander of the 1st
Anti-Tank Brigade) remembered: “New trains kept arriving, with new men and new military
equipment.” e official history of the Kiev military district stated: “Major General F. F.
10
Aliabushev’s 87th Rifle Division on June 14, under pretext of training exercises, was moved
to the state border.” 11
e moving of troops to the border under the pretext of training exercises was done on
orders from Moscow. Marshal Zhukov said: “ e Narkom [People’s Commissar] for Defense
S. K. Timoshenko recommended to the commanders of military districts to conduct tacti-
cal exercises in the direction of state borders, with the effect of bringing troops closer to the
regions of planned deployment for the purpose of cover.” As was previously done prior to
the Finnish campaign of 1940, “covering the state borders” was a code expression mean-
ing “preparing to cross the borders.” is recommendation was brought into effect by the
districts, but with a significant difference: “a significant part of artillery did not take part in
12
the move.”
Marshal of the Soviet Union K. K. Rokossovskii (at that time Major General, com-
mander of the 9th Motorized Corps) explains that the artillery had been ordered to the
border slightly earlier.
13
at was a brief description of the events of this day in one of the five border military
districts. On the eve of the broadcast of the TASS announcement, the commander of that
same Kiev special military district received another directive, with the same signatures and
same level of secrecy—“Top Secret, Special Importance.” e directive of June 12, 1941,
stated:

During the time period June 15 to July 10, 1941, the 16th army with the following com-
ponents will arrive on the territory of the Kiev special military district: the command of
the army with service personnel, 5th Mechanized Corps (13th and 17th Tank, and 109th
Motorized Divisions); 57th Tank Division; 32nd Rifle Corps (46th and 152nd Rifle
Divisions, 126th Corps Artillery Regiment). . . . I forbid all open telephone and telegraph
communication in connection with the arrival, unloading, and placement of the new
troops. Nobody except you, members of the Military Council, and the chief of staff in
the district, can know about this. . . . All units arriving to the territory of the district have